Source of Obligation

In the context of a transaction, two parties consent to take separate actions, each for the benefit of the other, and the expectation of gaining the benefit from the action of the other party becomes a motivation to perform the action that is expected of them by the other party. In this way, the actions are no longer independent of one another: one party would not be motivated to act for the benefit of the other were it not for the benefit they expected to receive in return.

One problem of this approach is in the focus on expectation. An individual is not obligated to undertake an action simply because it is expected by another – the obligation arises from a promise: an indication of intention that is presented to the other, with the intention that they would accept it as true and govern their own actions accordingly.

When conflict arises in the context of obligation, the blame is assigned to one of two parties. If the individual who presented the promise fails to act according to the terms of the promise, they are clearly in the wrong. If the individual who accepted the promise made assumptions about the terms of the promise (up to and including the notion that a promise had been communicated), the other party is not held accountable. Much argument arises from the conflict over what each party understood to be promised, and it merits consideration at a later time.

It’s also worth noting that there may be obligation that exists outside the context of a transaction: when one party indicates to another an intent to undertake an action without the necessity of the other party performing them any service in return, this is deemed to be a unilateral promise.

A unilateral promise is not enforceable as a contract. Because the actor received no obligation in return, the second party is not entitled to compensation for the failure of the actor to perform the action. However, if the second party undertook an action based on a unilateral promise, and suffered damage as a result, it can reasonably be argued that the action of the first party, in making the promise, caused harm to the second party, whose actions were based on expectations created by the first. This seems in the nature of deception or dishonestly rather than neglect of an obligation.

Considering the consequences of both bilateral and unilateral obligations, the common element seems to be an indication on the part of one party that is taken as earnest by the second, such that the future action of the second party is dependent on their expectation that the first party will act on the intentions they have communicated.

This seems to be around about way of suggesting that obligations arise from promises, regardless of whether any promise is made in return, and that the source of harm inherent in neglecting obligation arises from the actions that others may take on the belief that a promise is made in earnest.

Prioritization of Interests

Consideration of the hierarchy of needs as a basis for the prioritization of interests would suggest that the most ethical decision is driven by the utility to the lowest level of need. But I have a sense it’s not quite so simple.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences only to himself, it is plausible to consider that the definite sacrifice of a higher priority in order to definitely achieve a lower priority is irrational. (To be considered separately: do ethics even apply in such a situation?) However, in advance of an action being undertaken, the outcomes are not definite, and the decision-maker must consider probability.

In that sense, an individual may perceive that the chances of success at serving the lower priority are such that it is worth the risk to the higher priority. For example, entry into many social groups (a third-level priority) require an individual to undergo an initiation that poses an immediate threat to their well-being (a first-level priority). In is not unusual, nor necessarily irrational, for an individual to accept that risk.

The risk involved in investing is of a similar nature: while both the amount risked and the amount gained are a second-level priority (wealth, as a means to satisfy future needs), an individual may assess that the benefit of increasing their wealth is worth the risk of the amount they risk in the investment.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences to himself and another person, interests are viewed from the perspective of the decision maker. That is to say that a first-level priority of one party (their immediate need) is at best a third-level priority when the consequences to them is made by someone else (presuming they value their social connection to another party).

The ethics of survival puzzles generally play upon this principle: a person who has the authority an ability to decide on a disposition of a resource that is immediately needed for himself and another party, it is presumed that the inclination of the decision-maker is to serve his self-interest first. From a purely functional or purely psychological perspective, this may be entirely justified, but it is not necessarily acceptable from an ethical perspective.

When an individual makes a decision that has no consequences to himself, and the benefit or harm is only to other parties, similar factors are taken into consideration. When the benefit and harm are to be done to a single party, the decision-maker is to consider the value of each and the risks to be considered (in effect, to make as “good” a decision for the other party as he would for himself).

When the benefit is granted to one party at the expense of another, the decision-maker who is motivated entirely by self-interest can be expected to consider the value of each party to himself, and comes to a decision based on the value he places on his future relationship with each of the two parties. However, if the decision-maker has no existing relationship and expects to have no future relationship, his decision is arbitrary.

Much of this bears further consideration – but insofar as the prioritization of interests is concerned, it would seem acceptable to accept Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a basis for rational decision-making when the benefit and harm implicit in a decision pertain to a single party. However, it is not a complete answer to the dilemma faced by a decision-maker who is weighing consequences that benefit one party and harm another.