Nature of Obligation

My aim is to consider the circumstances in which the standards of ethics may conclude that an individual is obligated to act for the benefit of another party. This tends to be a difficult subject, and the focal point of much consideration and argument, and a fundamental consideration to ethics.

To begin, obligation is the focal point of ethics. When a person acts alone, undertaking an action that has no appreciable impact on other parties, the question of ethics do not arise. A person is expected to act in ways beneficial to himself as a matter of course. A person is entitled to act in ways that are harmful to himself, though this may seem irrational to an observer. The consideration of "right" and "wrong" are practical matters, nothing more.

The consideration of ethics begins only when a second party enters the stage, and the consequences of the actions undertaken by an actor impact this second person. They may have a direct impact, in which any harm or benefit immediately arises from the action, or an indirect impact, in that the consequences of the action alter the situation in a way that is ultimately beneficial or harmful to the other party by virtue of the change in the environment.

The fundamental question of ethics, then, is whether it is "right" for a person to take an action due to the consequences it may have for other parties. This gives rise to the notion that the individual is required to consider the impact to other parties before undertaking any course of action.

And at this, a working definition of obligation can be derived: obligation is the requirement for an individual to consider the consequences of an action to other parties in advance of undertaking that action.

While this may be tedious, my sense is that it might give rise to problems if the goal of obligation were not fully explored: given that the options are to act or refrain from acting, and given that the consequences may be beneficial or harmful, there are four possible outcomes (1):

Obligation to act in ways that are harmful to others

The notion that a person is obliged to harm others seems entirely absurd at first, and on further consideration it remains largely so. The only exception I can presently conceive is in reaction. It might be argued that acting in a way to harm another person effects restitution (when the actor seeks to be compensated for the harm done by the previous actions of another person) and a punitive value (when the harm inflicted on another is a punishment that is intended to dissuade them from repeating the action that elicited the reactive punishment).

Punitive action is a topic best suited for political and legal debate, so I expect to avoid it in future. While the notion of restitution seems germane to the topic of business, in that an individual who has performed a service and not received payment may feel obligated to obtain compensation in a manner that could be perceived as harmful to the other party, the primary interest in doing so is not to harm the other party, but to gain the benefit to which they feel entitled. This may bear further consideration in that context, but not in the sense of obligation.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are helpful to others

This notion seems unusual, though not quite as absurd as the former, in that the typical argument is based on the premise that when it is possible to help others, the obligation is to render aid rather than withhold it (which will be addressed later). Even so, my sense is that there are instances in which a person may be obligated to refrain from acting in a way that benefits other parties.

One instance in which it is logical to feel reluctance to render assistance is in the context of education or mentoring. The belief that another person will not learn a skill or be inclined to develop the facility for performing a task if another party intercedes to perform tasks in his benefit does seem to be rational. In this sense, the actor's intention in refraining from assisting is positive in its intent: to give to the other person not the immediate benefit they may wish to have, but instead a more long-term benefit of learning to accomplish the task for themselves.

Another instances in which it is logical to refrain from rendering assistance is in a situation where the actor accepts the limitation of his own knowledge. That is to say, the actor is uncertain whether the action he undertakes will render a benefit the other party desires without doing greater harm. In plainer terms, there is the obligation not to interfere in situations where you lack the information, experience, and knowledge to be sufficiently certain that the action will have a beneficial outcome.

Obligation to act in ways that are helpful to others

Under certain circumstances, the notion that a person may be obligated to undertake an action for the benefit of another party seems reasonable. However, the precise circumstances are a subject of much debate, and bear far more scrutiny that I can give them in the content of the present post.

I expect there will be many meditations in which the notion of this obligation is considered, and I can think of no general principle that I can state at the present time, without more intense consideration.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others

It seems to me that the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others is virtually an axiom. "Doing no harm" seems a requirement for considering an action to be wholly ethical. An individual is entitled act in a way that harms himself if he so desires, and obligated to suffer the negative consequences of his own actions is a matter of course, but I can find no rational basis the notion that an individual is obligated to harm others.

Exceptions to this principle seem absurd: the notion that a party would seek to obligate another to undertake an action in which the sole consequences would be to harm them would be the equivalent of acting, by proxy, to harm themselves - which would fall into the defined categories as altruistic, sacrificial, or insane.

Notes

1. I have conveniently omitted from the consideration above instances in which an action has no consequences for others, or instances in which the consequences do not result in appreciable harm or benefit to others. I don't wish to take these off the table, as a number of false dilemmas arise from the exclusion of the possibility of actions that have no appreciable consequence. However, I believe they can rightly be excluded from consideration in the context of obligation.

Categorization of Consequences

In considering the consequences of an action to self versus to others, there seem to be nine possible outcomes when comparing the consequences to self to the consequences to others, which can be schematized thus:

	Benefit Others	No Consequence	Harm Others
Benefit Self	Benevolent	Self-Interested	Questionable
No Consequence	Charitable	Inconsequential	Sociopathic
Harm Self	Altruistic	Sacrificial	Irrational

As a note, I'm not sure if the labels I've given to these categories are entirely accurate, but found that attempting to use some neutral indicator was either verbose ("actions that benefit the self while having no consequence to others") or incomprehensible ("Type BN" or "Type 2"). This may bear further consideration - but for the present, the intention is to consider the interplay of the outcomes.

And while it's been noted before, it bears repeating that "no consequence" is shorthand for "no significant consequence," in that all actions have some consequence, but the consequence has no significance under most circumstances.

I've considered the merits of considering each of these nine categories, in and of themselves, but have decided not to do so at the present time. It seems a bit overly oriented with details that may be inconsequential. I may change my mind about that later, but for now:

Actions that have no consequences for any party, called "inconsequential" in the table above, do not merit further inquiry. An action that has no consequence cannot be assessed as good or bad, but might reasonably be called a waste of time and resources. Perhaps the only interest to ethics is the choice of an inconsequential action over a beneficial alternative, but even that seems of little interest

Actions that have a benefit to one or both parties (benevolent, charitable, or self-interested) but cause no harm to anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "good" without the need to meditate upon it further.

Actions that harm one or both parties (sacrificial, sociopathic, or irrational) but precipitate no benefit for anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "bad" without the need to meditate upon it further.

The altruistic action, which harms self and benefits others, merits some consideration. However, even this is of limited interest to ethics, as the decision is entered into freely by the actor, who is just as entitled to act to his own detriment as he is to act in his own benefit. In situations where a third party attempts to manipulate or deceive an individual into harming himself for their benefit, ethics is applied to the action of manipulation or deceit separate from the altruistic action.

The category of greatest interest to ethics are those actions deemed questionable - where an actor seeks to benefit himself and accepts that there are negative consequences to others. The degree to which this is acceptable or unacceptable to ethics is largely a matter of degree. By the strictest application of ethics, a person is required to do no harm to others, even if this means foregoing any benefit he might gain by doing so. By a more liberal interpretation, a person may be forgiven for the harm to others if the harm done is of lesser degree than the benefit - but even in that interpretation, it is conceded that the action is essentially unethical.

Tasks in the Context of Action

This post began with another attempt to define the "roles" related to an action, but evolved into defining the tasks that are necessary to perform an action, according to its separate elements (situation, decision, action, and consequences). There may be some misuse of terms remaining in the information that follows.

Situation

When considering a given action, the roles in creating the situation seem to be little importance. To the decision, the situation is accepted as status quo - it exists independent of the decision at hand. However, there may be instances in which the preceding conditions have been created of affected by previous actions.

Even then, the present decision is unable to influence the situation, but the situation has a strong influence of the decision. But an individual who wishes to influence a decision may undertake actions for the sole purpose of influencing the decision.

The ethics of such actions are a separate consideration from the decision - specifically, the decision-maker does not "cause" a person to take action in advance of a decision, but it is rather the choice of the other party to undertake an independent action with a primary intention of affecting the decision to be made.

It can also be said that the application of formal authority is an attempt to modify the situation. The promise of reward or threat of punishment is a pre-existing condition of the decision, which is taken into account in the same manner as any other pre-existing condition. Whether the reward or punishment is actually administered is a consequence, and a separate decision of the influencer ... and for that matter, the decision to communicate a threat or promise is also a separate decision, made by the influencer.

There is also the potential to exert influence over a decision by misleading the decision-maker as to the nature of the situation. The action undertaken to mislead a person is separate from the decision, and the level of confidence a decision-maker places on a false representation (whether he should have trusted the report) merit further consideration, as does the question of whether a person who provides this information can be entirely objective.

Decision

The decision is a critical element in ethics: the individual who makes a decision is considered to take primary responsibility for the consequences of his decision. My sense is that there is one decision-maker for any given decision, and that the notion of a "group decision" is false, as the decision is made by one party, though others may participate in the process. I expect this to be argued, as the notion of a "group decision" is common - but this will be considered at another time.

Aside of providing information to the decision, which is addressed as part of the situation, there are individuals who attempt to influence the decision by participation in the decision-making process: suggesting the logic that should be applied, predicting the possible consequences, and otherwise providing information that is taken into account by the decision-maker.

Before the decision is put into action, there is a process of approval, in which other parties affirm the decision and indicate a willingness to commit resources to its execution. The latter is significant, as a decision is not made merely "to decide" but with the goal that the action decided upon will be undertaken, hence the refusal of any essential party to commit to the decision, and commit required resources to its execution, have significant influence over the decision-maker.

Action

Especially in organizational ethics, the individual who executes an action and the individual who makes the decision to act are often two different parties. The responsibility for the consequences is often shared between these two roles, though there is some argument over the degree to which responsibility applies.

In instances where the actor executes upon a decision made by another party, the ethics of his participation are primarily derived from his independent decision to comply with the orders he has been given. Compliance with an order does not usually exonerate the actor from bearing responsibility for the consequences, though it is generally considered to be a mitigating factor.

It's also worth noting that executing on a decision often requires additional decisions to be made. An order to build a bridge necessitates the executive to determine its design, obtain the materials, and coordinate the labor. These decisions may precipitate from his orders, but they are to be considered separate from the decision involved in issuing the order.

It's also worth noting that the decision to act is not made in an instant. There are few instances in which a commitment to undertake an action precludes the ability of an actor to cease activity at any time after it has begun. More often, there are constant opportunities to revisit the decision to act, and to desist in the course of action.

To return to the earlier concept of plurality, a group activity seems more plausible than a group decision - the members of a work crew much each contribute effort to achieve a goal. However, the decision of each member of the crew to apply himself to the execution of an action is an independent decision that he, alone, makes. In this regard, I presently make no distinction between an actor and an assistant, though I concede that additional consideration may discover significant differences in future.

Consequences

While I don't discount the possibility that there may be a role pertaining to the consequences of an action, I cannot immediately conceive of one. It would seem that the ability of the decision-maker and the actors to effect the consequences of an action are done during the time when the decision is being made and the actions are being undertaken. Once these have been done, the consequences are what they are.

The consequences of an action may necessitate further actions to be undertaken. This is of particular interest when the consequences are to be mitigated in arrears of an action that has caused harm or damage to be done, and there is said to be a responsibility to effect indemnity. But this becomes a separate decision, and a separate action.

However, in predicting the consequences of an action, it may be discovered that additional actions should be taken to guide the action or mitigate the consequences. The key difference is that this is done in advance of the action, rather than in arrears. An in that sense, any decision to include additional activities in a given action are part of the decision, rather than part of the consequences.

And in that sense, a person who provides information to the decision-maker about the possible consequences of an action that is under consideration is not acting in the context of the consequences, but is providing information in advance of the decision.

Even so, my sense is that isolating the task of assessing the consequences should be separated. While the implication is that the assessment will provide input into future decisions, the task itself is done in the context of the consequences, and possibly without an immediate intent to provide information to a specific future decision. I may revisit that later, but for the present, I will accept it as a "role."

Summation

In the consideration of the elements of action, a handful of tasks have been defined:

• Analyzing the situation
• Making the decision
• Influencing the decision
• Approving the decision
• Performing the action
• Assessing the consequences

Admittedly, I've switched channels from defining roles to defining tasks. My sense is that a "role" may include one or more of these tasks, and that the definition of roles may be arbitrary.

Analysis of Action

As ethics pertains to action, it would seem to be of value to determine some of the roles of individuals who may be involved or affected by a decision, in a general sense. However, before taking that step, it’s necessary to further consider the notion of “an action.”

Action

At its most basic level, an action consists of an activity that can be expressed as a verb (to purchase, to sell, to manufacture, to transport). That’s not to state that the other elements (who acts, what they act upon, what is affected, the manner, etc.) are unimportant, merely that the “verb” is the essential element. My sense is it would also be an active verb, as a passive verb implies being the subject of an action undertaken by another party, and a verb that merely describes a condition (merely “to be”) is of little interest to ethics.

The activity has a limited duration: it begins and ceases at definite times. To carry a stone from one place to another begins when the stone is picked up, persists during the motion, and concludes when the stone is put down. One may niggle over the details of precisely when the action begins and precisely when it ends, but even this acknowledges the existence of a beginning and ending to an action.

The action may also consist of multiple activities that occur, which are generally but not necessarily simultaneous. In the example given, there are three activities: picking up the stone, transporting it, and putting it down again. This seems a bit overly concerned with self-evident details, but my sense is that it bears consideration in situations in which analysis could be affected by the failure to correctly “bundle” activities into a single action.

Metadiscourse: I need to work out the terminology here – action, activity, and act – it’s all getting a bit tangled up.

Decision

Before an activity is undertaken, there is a decision to act. While there is the notion of spontaneous action, my sense is that this is a largely a false notion: while a person may act on the spur of the moment, doing the first thing that comes to mind, this constitutes a decision to act upon the first thing that arises without further consideration. It could also be argued that some actions are entirely accidental and unintentional - and while I cannot presently dismiss that argument, it seems to me that the majority of actions are neither accidental nor intentional, but are undertaken with some intent.

However, the converse cannot said to be true: that every decision results in an action. This seems self-evident, but my sense is that considering a decision that results in no action may be a notion that leads to specious reasoning: specifically, in the equivocation of "not acting" to "acting." Even if there is deliberation, leading to the decision from refraining to take action, a decision has been made. And it seems to me that there are still ethical consequences of a decision not to act, but I have the sense that these cannot be considered the moral equivalent of deciding to act. I will need to reflect on this further at another time. For now, the point is that an action is proceeded by a decision.

It’s also worth noting that an activity may include multiple decisions.

Consequences

After an action is undertaken, there are consequences that result from the action being undertaken. In some way (in fact, in several ways), the situation has been changed by the action having been undertaken.

Ethics is keenly interested in the consequences of action. When an action is assessed, it is most often due to the consequences of that action. The root action of dropping a stone is neither ethical nor unethical, but if the stone is dropped in such a way that someone or something is damaged by it, we then consider whether the act was ethical. That is, the actor should or should not have undertaken the action, not because the action was good or bad in and of itself, but because the consequences were good or bad.

It’s also worth noting that evaluating the ethics of an action that was taken in the past is of limited use: the past cannot be altered, though it may serve as a lesson to be taken into consideration in future. It may also be as the basis for future actions (does an activity in the past necessitate activities in future), but this seems a separate matter.

Primarily, ethics is concerned with the consequences of future actions, as a method to evaluate whether an action that has not yet occurred should be undertaken. That is to say, that the usefulness of ethics is in guiding decisions to act.

Situation

It also occurs to me that the environment has an impact: the particular details of the situation in which a decision is made. The decision is an attempt to effect a change in conditions – therefore the "before" state that describes the situation prior to action is the status quo that an action affects to achieve the “after” state.

Conditions also affect the decision: an action that is considered to be “right” in some conditions may be considered “wrong” under others. To return to the root example, to drop a stone is of no consequence if the preceding conditions are that there is nothing in a position to be damaged.

The conditions that exist after an action are included in the consequences. Of greater concern are the preceding conditions, which must be taken into account when making a decision. It may be that these conditions should be included in the decision, but because the decision cannot affect the preceding conditions, it does not seem logical to package them.

Chronology

The order above seems arbitrary, more related to the logical relation of the concepts than the chronological order of the elements of action. To put this straight, the order would be:

1. Preceding Conditions
2. Decision
3. Action
4. Consequences

Because of the interdependency of these four elements, an ethical evaluation that omitted any of them would likely be incomplete.

False Dichotomies

One of the key problems with many ethical systems is the acceptance of a false dichotomy: that one may do "right" or "wrong" and that there is no instance of an action that is neither right nor wrong. That is to say, no action is to be considered ethically neutral.

But it seems to me that there are situations in which ethics do not apply. Specifically, if an action is to be assessed by the beneficial or detrimental consequences, it follows that an action without consequences cannot be assessed as right or wrong by any standard of ethics.

While it is difficult to conceive of an action has no consequences whatsoever, it seems to me that there are actions where the consequences are so negligible that it is absurd to attempt to apply ethics. Without specifying additional conditions that would change the fundamental nature of the action, one cannot reasonably say that to stand or to sit is an "ethical" decision. There are no appreciable consequences of the action to anyone but the actor, and the consequences to the actor himself are negligible.

I have the sense, but am not prepared to state it emphatically as a conclusion, that any action that an individual undertakes that has no consequence to anyone but himself is beyond ethical consideration. That a person acts in their own benefit is to be expected. That a person may act in a way that harms himself is a less comfortable notion, but still seems to be beyond the scope of ethics. I will give this more thought.

Another problem with binary systems is that they assume man is faced with a choice of doing right or doing wrong. Aside of doing something that is neither right nor wrong, there is also the possibility that a man may not "do" anything at all. Ethics pertain to actions, and an action must be undertaken in order for ethics to apply.

This may be subject to greater debate. There is a popular notion that failure to do good is the equivalent of doing evil, or vice-versa. There are an infinite number of actions that might be undertaken at any given moment, and an individual's choice not to do any of them cannot be assessed as good (because he fails to choose any of the evil actions) or evil (because he fails to choose any of the good actions).

In this sense, inertia must be regarded as ethically neutral. An action that is not undertaken cannot be assessed as ethical or unethical, simply because no action has actually occurred, nor any consequence effected.

Said another way, ethics assesses the consequences of an action. If there is no action, or if there are no consequences to an action, ethics simply does not apply.

Right and Wrong: Fundamental Consideration

At this point, I think I have sufficient material to begin to consider the factors that make a decision "right" or "wrong" in terms of ethics.

An action that has only positive or beneficial consequences is to be considered "right" by the standards of ethics, and the decision to undertake such action is to be considered sound.

An action that has only negative or harmful consequences is to be considered "wrong" by the standards of ethics, and the decision to undertake such action is to be considered unsound.

These are very simplistic premises, and I expect that they will require revision as they are considered in greater detail, but I think that the fundamentals will hold.

If one considers all the consequences of an action, to all parties impacted by them, including any opportunity cost, and finds that they are universally beneficial or harmful, then it would be difficult to dispute the conclusion of whether the action, and the decision to undertake the action, is right or wrong.

The problem, of course, is that there are very few instances in which the outcome of an action is universally positive or negative. Given that a decision may lead to actions that have mixed consequences, the overall assessment of the right/wrong of the action involves a balance of positive and negative outcomes to arrive at an overall judgment of the soundness of the decision.

It's also worth noting that evaluating the outcomes of a single action is fundamental, but it is not the full scope of ethics. In many instances, there are multiple options for action - and at the very least, there are always two choices to be considered (to undertake an action or to refrain from doing so), and it would seem that ethics would require a decision-maker to undertake the option that is "best" in terms of its outcomes.

I'm not sure that I entirely agree with that premise - it implies that ethics is a reduced to the consideration of efficiency or productivity - and my sense is that it may be premature to begin pondering dilemmas, so I'll refrain from comparative considerations until another time, and keep focus on the ethics of a single action, with the concession that it is overly simplistic.

Consequences: To Self and to Others

A significant factor in assessing the ethics of a decision lies in the parties impacted by a decision. The primary distinction seems to be the individual who makes a decision, others who can influence the decision, and others who have no influence over the decision. Each of these parties may be subject to the consequences of a given decision.

It is supposed that an individual who makes a decision, but is not impacted by the consequences of that decision, is in an objective position and is best qualified to make the determination of which course of action to undertake. I would not entirely agree with that assessment: primarily, because I cannot presently conceive on an instance in which a person is not impacted by a decision that he, himself, makes. The decision-maker's interests are served at some level.

When an individual who makes a decision is impacted by the consequences, and makes the decision that is of greatest benefit to himself, this is perceived as deciding in self-interest. It is presumed that a rational individual will make the decision that is of greatest benefit to himself.

There is a special case in which the consequences of a decision impact only the person who makes the decision - no other party will benefit from or be harmed by the consequences of the action that is subject to the decision. This is unusual, but not entirely unheard of, and I would suggest that such decisions are outside the scope of ethics.

However, it stands to reason that ethics may imply a duty on others who are aware of such a decision to intervene in instances where an individuals make a decisions that are harmful to themselves. Whether intervening in this manner is right or wrong is a topic to be considered later - but for the present, it is concluded that instances in which an individual makes a decision that impact only himself are outside the scope of ethics, at least for the individual making the decision (whether to intervene is a separate decision).

When the consequences of a decision by one person have an impact on others, that decision becomes a subject of ethical consideration: specifically, whether the individual has the "right" to make a decision that impacts others, and whether the individual is to be held accountable for the impact of their decision upon others.

There is the notion of whether the others who are impacted by the decision have a corresponding duty to the decision-maker. If one is harmed by the action of another, does one have the "right" to retaliate or extract compensation? If one is benefited by the action of another, does one "owe" anything to the decision-maker? However, these are separate topics, as what is under consideration is not the present action, but a separate action to be taken in response.

In terms of the ethics of the immediate decision, the question arises of what level of consideration should be given to the benefit or harm that will be done to others.

Also, a mitigating factor in the impact to others is whether the other party who is impacted by a decision had advance knowledge, the opportunity to influence or participate in the decision-making process, and who actively participated in carrying out the action that were the results of the decision.

I don't propose to address these issues immediately, merely to identify them as an area of consideration when evaluating the ethics of a decision.

Consequences: Opportunity Cost

The concept of opportunity cost has been implied, but not directly addressed, by previous posts. Specifically, the consequences of action may be situations that are caused by the action itself, but there is also the negation of other opportunities.

Using something for one purpose prevents its use for other purposes. Wood that is used to fuel a fire cannot be used to build a house - though when the situation is reversed, the wood used to build the house cannot be used to fuel a fire at that time, though the wood may be taken from the house and burned (but at some point, the amount of wood taken would cause the house to no longer exist).

When speaking in terms of commodities, the concept may seem a bit vague. Given a sufficient quantity of wood, some of it may be used to fuel a fire, and some of it may be used to build a house. And if the quantity is insufficient, one may seek out other wood to increase supply to satisfy both purposes. But at some level, "wood" becomes unique: a specific piece of wood can be used for only one of these purposes.

Sufficiency of supply is considered in terms of ethics, but it is also a concept that is of interest to economics: given the scarcity of supply, such that it is not possible for all who demand an item to have use of it, how is the determination made as to which party may use it.

This bears consideration, but not at the present time. For now, I will limit the consideration to a single individual, in possession of an item that will be consumed in undertaking an action, and who must consider that the consequences of his action include the unavailability of the item for other purposes.

Opportunity cost also applies to things that are not tangible - such as time. An individual who chooses to undertake a course of action that consumes time accepts, as part of that decision, that it will not be possible to spend his time doing other things.

In both senses, the decision of which course of action to pursue is to be assessed not merely by its direct outcomes, but by the elimination of other opportunities.

Consequences: Direct and Indirect

Thus far, consequence of action has been considered mostly in a direct manner, but this is an incomplete view of consequences. Often, the consequences that are of greatest interest to ethics are those that are not directly related to the action, but precipitate from the action through a chain of causation.

For example, the action of drawing water from a village well causes there to be less water in the well for others to draw upon. This is a direct consequence. Taken to an extreme, withdrawing all water from a well causes the well to run dry. There being no water in the well may result in other consequences, such as the resource being unavailable to water crops.

This sets up a chain of causation: drawing water from the well causes there to be no water available for crops, causes the crops to die of dehydration, causes those who depend upon those crops to starve. And for that reason, we would assess the act of drawing water from the well to be bad/wrong because the precipitating consequence is harmful.

Having a chain of causation adds complexity to consideration. We might ask if the person who drew the water from the well was aware of the precipitating effect, several links further down the chain. We might also inquire as to whether at any point, action could have been taken by others to avoid the consequences (could the well have been dug deeper, or another water source found to provide for the crops) - and, if so, if it is the responsibility of the actor to have undertaken such an action, for the sake of drawing water.

My sense is that much of this is specific to the situation, and it would be difficult to draw a general conclusion. In a broad sense, ethics applies to indirect consequences, but the length of the chain of causation and the possibility of mitigation may be mitigating factors.

Consequences: Intentional vs Unintentional

In considering ethics, it is generally accepted that the intentional consequences of an action are of primary importance in determining whether a decision was ethical. It's generally held that a person who acts intentionally to cause harm is "worse" than an individual whose actions happened to cause harm, but that causing harm was not their intention.

I expect this is because ethics is based on reason: the factors that were taken into consideration in making a decision can be said to have influenced that decision, and any factor that was not taken into consideration had no impact on the decision, though they may have had an impact on the consequences.

However, failure to consider consequences, while not a deliberate choice to do harm, is not entirely ethically inconsequential. In arrears, we consider an individual to be responsible for any harm that results as a consequence of their actions, regardless of whether they were intentional. And as such, we consider an individual responsible for considering all possible consequences of an action in making the decision whether to undertake the action itself.

Said another way, failure to consider the consequences is a failure of ethics, though not as grievous as considering, but disregarding, the same consequences.

Even so, there remains a mitigating factor for unintentional consequences of an action: whether it was possible for the consequences to be foreseen. We accept the imperfection of human logic: we are not by nature omniscient, and therefore there are factors that are not known that will lead to outcomes that cannot be predicted. And in such instances, we further mitigate the culpability of the individual in making a decision.

For past action, there remains some argument over what "could have been known", coupled with suspicion about the honesty of a person who suggests that the reason they failed to predict an outcome was that they did not know. Much is left to conjecture.

However, for future action, the scope of knowledge is a matter of fact: the individual who makes a decision knows what they know before the decision is made, and any knowledge that comes to light after the decision is made (or when the action is initiated and cannot be prevented) can accurately be said to have been "not known" in making the decision - though one may argue in arrears that the decision-maker failed to exercise due diligence.

Another factor in gauging future consequences is probability. There are seldom instances where we can be perfectly certain before taking an action of what the consequences will actually be. We are limited to assessing the likelihood of consequences - and we make a decision based on the likelihood of outcomes.

In this way, decision-making is different from the act of assessing past decisions: once an action has occurred and consequences have resulted, we have better knowledge (not entirely perfect, but much more accurate) of the consequences of the action.

Form this, a future decision cannot be accurately assessed as being "good," but merely whether it is sound: if the individual who makes the decision has made a sufficient effort to discover the possible consequences, and made a decision based on a sufficiently reasonable assessment of the likelihood of outcomes, we can then say that the person has made an ethically sound decision, regardless of what the actual outcome happens to be when the action is undertaken.

The evaluation of sufficiency remains arguable. This should be considered.

Ethics and Law

It was suggested that, when considering the ethics of consequences, that there is limited value in considering the consequences of past actions, except as a method of deriving guidance, from experience, for making decisions that will have consequences in the future.

Past action is also the primary concern of law, which seeks to add punishment in arrears as a method of justice, to "correct" the effects of a historical action and to add to the negative consequences of future actions of the same nature. If a person acts in a way that harms others, but does no harm to himself, he may not be dissuaded from undertaking the same action again in future, and doing further harm to others.

This leads to the topic of law, which is a different topic than I had intended to address in this blog - but it cannot be altogether avoided, as the judicial system adds punitive consequences to an action: one may undertake an action that is not harmful to anyone, and the legal system may cause harm to the actor.

When making a decision in which one may expect there to be legal consequences, to oneself of others, these consequences bear consideration and may influence the decision. However, they are inconsequential to the ethical consideration of an action: what is prohibited by law is not necessarily "wrong" and what is permitted (or required) by law is not necessarily "right."

Neither would it be correct to say that the legal consequences are consequences of the action itself. The action of punishment (or reward) is the result of an entirely separate decision, often made by an entirely separate actor.

From a practical perspective, it is worthwhile to consider punishment or reward in the decision as to whether to take an action. From an ethical perspective, punishment and reward are a separate matter.

Complexity of Consequences

The plurality of "consequences" is not incidental: an action may, and generally does, have multiple consequences. The act of building a fire may have the consequence of producing heat, but it also produces light, consumes fuel, and emits smoke. On a small scale, the additional consequences may seem irrelevant, but when the scale increases, the consequences become more significant: by building numerous, large fires over a long period of time, the consumption of fuel and emission of smoke can have significant impacts on the environment.

My sense is that, in considering actions, the entirety of the consequences of that action should be taken into consideration. One of the fundamental flaws I have noticed in other sources is that an action is considered to be ethical or unethical due to one specific consequence, ignoring all of the other consequences of that action. It is also my sense that the multiplicity of consequences makes evaluating ethics complex: if some of the consequences are good, and others are bad, assessing the rightness of the action necessitates a great amount of consideration.

To further the complexity, an action is not taken in isolation. To return to the previous example, the act of building a fire requires other actions to be undertaken in advance (one must gather fuel and choose a location) as well as necessitating other actions in arrears (it could reasonably be suggested that an individual who creates a fire must also extinguish it, dispose of the ashes, and restore the site - though whether these are necessary is arguable).

I expect this will require quite a few entries to address these considerations. For the present, the point seems to be that a given action has multiple consequences, and the process of evaluating an action must strive to be comprehensive in consideration of all of these consequences.

However, the evaluation of consequences is not as simple as a checklist. The practice of making "lists" of outcomes, good and bad, and deciding that the longer list "wins" is imprecise, as there is the matter of the degree of impact. One cannot consider any positive impact ("by lighting a fire, I provided warmth") to be the equivalent of any negative impact ("by lighting a fire, I have burned down my neighbor's house"). All consequences are not equal - though the evaluation of the degree of rightness or wrongness of action is dependent on the determination of right and wrong, which is a topic that has been postponed.

Ethics of Consequences

In the context of action, it was concluded that an action is not ethical in and of itself, but the consequences of that action provoke a consideration of the ethics. In a fundamental sense, an ethical evaluation assesses the consequences of an action were good or bad - and from there, to work backward: if the consequences were good, the action was good.

It is possible to take another step backward: consequences arise from actions, which arise from decisions. In fact, it seems essential to do so. If ethics focuses entirely on actions that have already been taken, it has no value in guiding behavior. That is not to say that there is no point in analyzing pas actions: while the past cannot be changed, the lessons taken from it provide guidance for future decisions, which is the value of ethics.

It is also possible to take a second step backward: consequences arise from actions, which arise from decisions, which are made by people. This returns to the previous question of whether a person can be considered to be ethical, but arrives at the same tautology that led me to dismiss "person" as the subject of evaluation: a good person makes good decisions, which might imply that every decision made by a good person is a good decision.

While there remains the concept of the "good person," my sense is this is useful evaluation, as social existence depends on trust, and trust is earned over time by an individual who makes good decisions (based on the notion that a person's character guides them to act in a consistently good or bad manner) - but this bears further consideration. For the present, we focus on consequences, as each decision to act may be good or bad, independent of the person who makes that decision (i.e., a good person does not always make good decisions, but may make a bad decision, hence the good or bad rests in the decision, and not the person).

It must also be acknowledge that, thus far, "good" and "bad" have been considered in an overly vague and general sense. It is presumed that a positive or beneficial outcome is "good" whereas a negative or harmful outcome is "bad." It seems to me that these concepts are far more complex than that, but I will continue along that line of logic and return to the "essence" of good/bad at a later time.

So to revisit the second step backward: consequences arise from actions, which arise from decisions, which are made on the basis of motives. And while that seems logical, the chain of causation weakens: while we can consider the motives that drive a decision as a method for evaluating the ethics of the decision, the consequences of the action may not entirely jibe with the motives. That is to say that we can appreciate the desire to do good, but ultimately assess ethics not merely by the desire, but by the outcome. And even in evaluating decisions in advance of outcome, "good intentions" do not guarantee a good outcome, nor pardon the actor from any negative consequence of his action.