Nature of Relationships

There are many kinds of relationships, each of which has its own nature. Even relationships of the same general kind may entail different responsibilities in different instances. So deriving general principles of ethics that apply to all relationships between all parties is complex and any conclusion would be wrought with inaccuracies. However, there seem to be some basic principles:

Primarily, relationships entail a sequence of transactions between two parties, as previously considered. In some instances, the serial transactions and the recurring obligations that arise are the only basis for the relationship, and the only responsibility of one party to another.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, a relationship may be based on a general notion that does not yield a definite and specific course of action: parties may enter into a relationship in which each is expected to act in the interests of the other, without a clear indication of what actions may be necessary in future, or which interests they are expected to serve, or what situations may arise, etc.

The more the two parties communicate their expectations, the clearer the course of action that each party must undertake to preserve the relationship. The notion that one party should understand, without communication, the expectations of the other, is the source of much debate and strife - though from an ethical perspective, a party is held responsible only for fulfilling those expectations of which he is aware. This is derived from the nature of a single transaction.

It's worth noting that a given culture may attempt to define the nature of certain relationships - that in a given country, religion, or group of people, a term such as "marriage" defines the terms of a relationship - but even this is mutable. Not all cultures define "marriage" in the same way, nor does every individual within a culture have the same understanding of the concept. It seems to me that deference to a cultural definition is not an acceptable substitute for communication, and that in entering into a relationship, the two parties bear the responsibility of negotiation of the terms their specific relationship, even if they are of the same culture.

There also seems to be, in the context of relationships, an expectation of gratuitous action - that is, that one party will act in the interests of the other while expecting nothing specific in return. My sense is that this is not a condition of the relationship, and can happen outside a relationship, and that the nature of this action is not affected by the existence of a relationship, so the notion of gratuitous action merits separate consideration.

Also similar to transactions, relationships are established by mutual consent. In some instances, it may be argued that a person is forced or compelled to participate in a relationship (for example, relationships of proximity are largely involuntary), though it would seem that the nature of involuntary relationships merits separate consideration from the voluntary relationship, which is more common.

Relationships are also maintained by mutual consent. If, at any time during the relationship, one party wishes to discontinue the relationship, then the relationship is ended. In some instances, there may be a sense of lingering obligations to another party to complete certain transactions in recompense for the other party's past action, but "breaking" the relationship otherwise liberates both parties from the obligation to future actions or any further involvement with one another.

Given this consideration, a basic definition of a "relationship" is derived as a set of terms by which two parties obligate themselves to act in one another's interest. This still strikes me as vague - but given that a relationship is a concept that may manifest itself in an infinite number of ways, the notion is inherently vague.

Source of Obligation

In the context of a transaction, two parties consent to take separate actions, each for the benefit of the other, and the expectation of gaining the benefit from the action of the other party becomes a motivation to perform the action that is expected of them by the other party. In this way, the actions are no longer independent of one another: one party would not be motivated to act for the benefit of the other were it not for the benefit they expected to receive in return.

One problem of this approach is in the focus on expectation. An individual is not obligated to undertake an action simply because it is expected by another – the obligation arises from a promise: an indication of intention that is presented to the other, with the intention that they would accept it as true and govern their own actions accordingly.

When conflict arises in the context of obligation, the blame is assigned to one of two parties. If the individual who presented the promise fails to act according to the terms of the promise, they are clearly in the wrong. If the individual who accepted the promise made assumptions about the terms of the promise (up to and including the notion that a promise had been communicated), the other party is not held accountable. Much argument arises from the conflict over what each party understood to be promised, and it merits consideration at a later time.

It’s also worth noting that there may be obligation that exists outside the context of a transaction: when one party indicates to another an intent to undertake an action without the necessity of the other party performing them any service in return, this is deemed to be a unilateral promise.

A unilateral promise is not enforceable as a contract. Because the actor received no obligation in return, the second party is not entitled to compensation for the failure of the actor to perform the action. However, if the second party undertook an action based on a unilateral promise, and suffered damage as a result, it can reasonably be argued that the action of the first party, in making the promise, caused harm to the second party, whose actions were based on expectations created by the first. This seems in the nature of deception or dishonestly rather than neglect of an obligation.

Considering the consequences of both bilateral and unilateral obligations, the common element seems to be an indication on the part of one party that is taken as earnest by the second, such that the future action of the second party is dependent on their expectation that the first party will act on the intentions they have communicated.

This seems to be around about way of suggesting that obligations arise from promises, regardless of whether any promise is made in return, and that the source of harm inherent in neglecting obligation arises from the actions that others may take on the belief that a promise is made in earnest.