Trust and Business Relationships

It's been considered that the notion of a relationship between two parties adds complexity to their interactions, and that in its most basic sense, a relationship arises from a series of interactions (11/28) that create individual periods of obligation that overlap, giving the sense of an ongoing commitment between two parties. However, the notion that a relationship is something "more" than a series of transactions is not uncommon.

I'd like to explore this notion further, though at the same time to isolate it from the broader sense of relationships. The "relationship" between members of a community is of interest to ethics in a political sense, but is largely out of scope in the context of business (except in the relationship between business and community), and domestic and social relationships also seem to be beyond the scope of business ethics.

It's also my sense that any party who interacts with another party in the context of business could be said to have a relationship (stockholder, employee, executive, competitor, etc.), and these may merit separate consideration. For the present, I'll focus on the ongoing relationship between vendor and customer.

Not all commercial transactions take place in the context of a relationship. There is the notion of the one-time sale, in which the obligation of the buyer and seller end at a specific time, and the lack of a repeat purchase leaves both parties with the impression that they are "done" with the other.

Granted, there are various stipulations and expectations inherent in such a transaction, which may vary according to the nature of the good or service that is purchased, and there are instances in which a buyer may be dissatisfied with the transaction and seek redress. But provided that all goes well and both parties are satisfied, the transaction is completed.

One of the chief indicators of transactional satisfaction is the willingness of the buyer to repurchase from the same supplier (and conversely, the willingness of the seller to enter into a transaction with the buyer). While there may be some argument that satisfaction does not have to be complete in every way for this to occur, and that one or both parties may be accepting some compromises for the sake of convenience, it would be difficult to assert that parties who seek to repeat a transaction are significantly dissatisfied with their previous encounter.

The significant difference between an initial purchase and a rebuy transaction is that the latter implies a degree of trust. Each party assumes that the repeat transaction will be essentially the same as the one before, and has a reasonable expectation of the other party that the repurchase will be essentially the same as the initial purchase.

In this regard, it is reasonable to assert that the expectations of each party constitute an obligation on the part of the other party to undertake the responsibility to ensure the uniformity of the transaction to previous experience, or to provide information to the other party if it is foreseen that it will be different than before. To withhold or conceal information that would make the other party aware of a difference is a form of deception.

To some degree, the same can be said of the initial transaction, but the responsibility to provide information is not as compelling, as there is no previous experience between the parties. As they are unknown to one another, each assumes a certain level of risk in entering into a transaction, and should things go awry, there is no established trust to be violated. However, once this transaction is completed, it is reasonable for each party to assume future transactions will be measured against this standard.

It seems to me that this is what is meant by the notion of "trust" among parties who are in a relationship. In some situations, it may be arguable that trust creates additional obligations, but at the minimum, trust is based on consistency of transactions between two parties that routinely interact.

Duration of Obligation

With the exception of the imperative to do no harm, obligations are limited in their term. At some point, the obligation is fulfilled. In some instances, an obligation is fulfilled at the completion of an act; in others, it has greater longevity. Ultimately, it seems to reason that the duration of obligation is negotiable, but the duration varies greatly. The example of a commercial transaction is sued to illustrate this notion:

The obligation of the buyer is fulfilled upon receipt of payment. To split hairs, the obligation is not satisfied by merely tendering payment, as a buy who tenders payment in the form of a rubber check or counterfeit currency has not satisfied his obligation. In most instances, the payment is accepted and validated in a short amount of time, and the buyer's obligation is fulfilled.

The obligation of the seller, meanwhile, has greater longevity. In most instances, their obligation to the buyer is not fulfilled by delivering a physical good or performing a service, but persists for a reasonable amount of time afterward. Primarily, if the seller has misrepresented the nature of the good itself, this is fundamentally no different than a buyer who has presented counterfeit currency.

Beyond that, the seller remains obligated until the item has been consumed or a reasonable amount of time has passed, such that age or usage could reasonably be expected to devalue the item for its intended purpose. The qualification of "reasonable" indicates that there is some variance that I will not presently explore. There is also the notion that the seller must share responsibility for any harm that arises from the use of an item that he has provided to a buyer, but this is a separate matter from the sales transaction.

And so, in the context of a single transaction the obligations between buyer seller are limited in their duration. In a basic sense, the buyer's obligation terminates on receipt of payment, and the sellers obligation terminates on the consumption of the goods provided.

An ongoing relationship between buyer and seller can be seen in a basic sense as a chain of transactions, with the obligation of seller to buyer renewing on each purchase (though to be precise, each obligation is entirely separate, so it is not a renewal of the same obligation but the initiation of a separate obligation, similar to the previous one).

It is in this sense that obligations take on persistence: it is understood that the buyer will be inclined (of importance - "inclined" and not "required") to return to the same seller, and that the seller will be inclined to serve the same buyer, so long as each fulfills their obligations in the previous transaction. And given the experience of successful transactions, a level of trust will arise for mutual obligations to be fulfilled. And until such time as the trust remains, the relationship persists.

My sense is I've digressed to a separate topic (relationships) which merits further consideration on its own - but in the context of the duration of obligation, it's significant to note that an "ongoing" obligation arises through repeat transactions - it is not separate and independent of the individual transactions.

Source of Obligation

In the context of a transaction, two parties consent to take separate actions, each for the benefit of the other, and the expectation of gaining the benefit from the action of the other party becomes a motivation to perform the action that is expected of them by the other party. In this way, the actions are no longer independent of one another: one party would not be motivated to act for the benefit of the other were it not for the benefit they expected to receive in return.

One problem of this approach is in the focus on expectation. An individual is not obligated to undertake an action simply because it is expected by another – the obligation arises from a promise: an indication of intention that is presented to the other, with the intention that they would accept it as true and govern their own actions accordingly.

When conflict arises in the context of obligation, the blame is assigned to one of two parties. If the individual who presented the promise fails to act according to the terms of the promise, they are clearly in the wrong. If the individual who accepted the promise made assumptions about the terms of the promise (up to and including the notion that a promise had been communicated), the other party is not held accountable. Much argument arises from the conflict over what each party understood to be promised, and it merits consideration at a later time.

It’s also worth noting that there may be obligation that exists outside the context of a transaction: when one party indicates to another an intent to undertake an action without the necessity of the other party performing them any service in return, this is deemed to be a unilateral promise.

A unilateral promise is not enforceable as a contract. Because the actor received no obligation in return, the second party is not entitled to compensation for the failure of the actor to perform the action. However, if the second party undertook an action based on a unilateral promise, and suffered damage as a result, it can reasonably be argued that the action of the first party, in making the promise, caused harm to the second party, whose actions were based on expectations created by the first. This seems in the nature of deception or dishonestly rather than neglect of an obligation.

Considering the consequences of both bilateral and unilateral obligations, the common element seems to be an indication on the part of one party that is taken as earnest by the second, such that the future action of the second party is dependent on their expectation that the first party will act on the intentions they have communicated.

This seems to be around about way of suggesting that obligations arise from promises, regardless of whether any promise is made in return, and that the source of harm inherent in neglecting obligation arises from the actions that others may take on the belief that a promise is made in earnest.

Harm to Opportunity

There is a notion that it is possibly to do harm to others by undertaking actions that obstruct their opportunity to act – that is, because you have done something, another person no longer has the opportunity to act in a way that he intended: your action has prevented his action. While this seems plausible, it is extremely tenuous.

It is reasonable to conclude that one action may prevent another, whether by means of physical obstruction or by altering the environment in a way that the prerequisites of the second action are no longer possible. For a solitary individual in an environment devoid of others, it is an objective fact that the choice to perform one action prevents the performance of others, even if the only prerequisite is the time required to perform the task. In a social setting, it becomes more problematic.

My sense is that the notion of property settles most of the disputes about obstruction of opportunity. One cannot rightly claim that another person has obstructed his action if he had not the material prerequisites to undertake that action. That is to say, the person must own the property necessary to the action, or have the permission of the owner to use it.

In the latter instance, where the owner of property has granted permission to multiple parties for the use of property (such as “public” property that the state proposes to be available to all citizens), such conflicts can arise, and it is generally accepted that the owner is responsible for resolving these conflicts by being more specific in the conditions of the permission granted other parties. In the context of politics, this is the basis of a considerable amount of law.

With this in mind, I am unable to conceive of an instance in which the notion of doing harm by obstructing another party could be said to exist where no property is involved. And so, if one considers harm to opportunity, it is most often a consequence of harm to property – though the logic seems to become circular when harm to property is grounded in the harm to opportunity. As such, I can conclude that the two are related, but the cause-and-effect nature of this relationship remains a bit muddled (specifically, in terms of which derives from the other).

Harm to Property

The notion of “property” entails the authority to use physical objects. Items are understood to belong to an “owner,” whether an individual or a group of individuals, who have control over their property and are entitled to use it. A person does not have an entitlement to the property of anyone else, except by permission of the owner.

This notion is much debated in politics, and while that is beyond the scope of this study, it stands to note that political systems also ascribe to the notion of property, whether it is the use of property by a governmental organization, or when the ownership is implicit in that the privilege of any citizen or class to use the property by permission of government. While I’d prefer to avoid digressing, I expect there will invariably arise an instance in which property is controlled by government, or in which the property of an individual is usurped by government (e.g., taxation), and will consider it further in that context.

For the present, my sense is that it can be taken as premise that an individual or organization claims certain items as “owned” and maintains the right to use them or grant permission for others to use them, and other parties are expected to acknowledge their ownership and refrain from doing harm to the property of others without explicit permission.

It’s also worth nothing that property is central to the notion of business, as the chief activities of business pertain not to action, but to property: obtaining property, using it, providing it to others) in exchange for other property), so I expect it is a topic of constant concern.

In the present context of doing harm, harm to property is derive from harm to person. To damage or destroy property is to diminish or eliminate the owner’s ability to act in the interests of serving their needs to which that property is requisite. For example, to destroy or taint food is to interfere with the owner’s ability to eat, which is in turn to do physical damage to the owner of property.

Neglect versus Harm

In considering of the notion of "doing harm" to others, harm was considered only as a consequences of action. I have considered the possibility that harm could also be considered to arise from a person's neglect to act - and am led to the conclusion that this is not the equivalent of doing harm.

Primarily, an action is considered to be ethical or unethical by virtue of its consequences. When a person has not taken an action, no consequences have been effected, and there is no basis for the ethical evaluation of something that has no been done. Even so, there remains the argument that harm has been done by an individual's neglect.

This does not stand to reason: in a situation where an individual has neglected to undertake an action for the benefit of another party, harm is not caused. The other party was already in a situation where harm would come to them, and the neglect of another party to render assistance is not the cause of that harm, nor does their choice not to render assistance, in itself, cause the harm to be increased - the harm would befall the other party if the actor were entirely absent from the situation, and his mere presence does not obligate him to act.

This is not to say that neglect is acceptable in all situations: specifically, in the instance where there is a relationship between to individuals, it is generally (though not universally) understood that one of the conditions of a relationship is mutual assistance in time of need.

While this seems a reasonable conclusion, it rests upon a few notions that have not been explored as yet: the notion of a relationship (which has been considered previously 10/5 but in a superficial manner) and the notion that conditions of a relationship may be implicit.

The concept that a relationship exists between any two parties due to proximity is largely a concern of politics - which implies that otherwise unacquainted persons have an implicit relationship with one another as members of a of a given society or community (which are also abstract notions) - and that any member of a society is obligated, under certain circumstances, to provide assistance to other members of the society. But again, political arguments are beyond the scope of the topic of this blog.

While I cannot concede the obligation of one person to render aid to another, I can conceive that a party may feel entitled to grant assistance to others, and that this may in certain situations be entirely ethical. Provided he has sufficient understanding of the situation to be reasonably certain that the other party will come to harm, the decision to render aid is rational. And provided his actions do no harm, the action may be considered to be ethical.

However, this is a digression to another topic - whether it is ethical to undertake action for the benefit of others, which has previously been considered. The present question is whether it neglecting to act for the benefit of others can be considered the equivalent of doing harm - and I am reasonably confident in the conclusion that it cannot.

Doing Harm to Others

It has been concluded that an obligation that arises by virtue of the social environment is the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that do harm to others. The notion is that this is an obligation merits further consideration - but for the present, my intention is to focus on the concept of "doing harm."

The most plausible rationale for concluding that an action has done harm is in that it has ended the life of another person, as life has been defined as the primary value, from which all other values derive. This would seem to be axiomatic.

It would follow, then, that one could also conclude that harm has been done by any action that is derived from this fundamental value. To return to the hierarchy of needs, any action that places a person in immediate peril by preventing their ability to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, etc. can be concluded to do harm to that individual.

There is also some merit to the notion of there being degrees of harm: to injure a person is to do less harm than to injure him, to steal water that he is in immediate need of is to do less harm than to steal water he has secured to meet his future needs, to cause a neighbor to mistrust him is to do less harm than to subvert the trust of his spouse.

By strict and binary logic, to do harm at all is unethical, but the consideration of the degree of harm that has been done may be significant in some decisions. In particular, when an action would benefit one party and harm another, it may be reasoned that the benefit is "worth" the harm. I do not have the sense that the action can be considered ethical, since harm is done - but it stands to reason that certain decisions may involve choosing the least unethical course of action.

This brings to mind the assertion that it is impossible, under any circumstances, to take any action without causing harm to someone. I'm inclined to disagree - primarily because the notion is generally backed either by hypothetical situation involving conditions that are highly improbable, or contortions of logic that stretch and distort the concept of harm, or both.

The notion of harm becomes weaker at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It seems less plausible to assert that one has "done harm" if an action causes a person to feel less self-esteem or obstructs an individual from becoming more "self-actualized." It seems to me that the attempt to place upon another person an obligation for preserving one's own sense of self-worth is a manipulative tactic, common to the passive-aggressive personality type. While there may be some merit to this notion, I am unable to presently conceive of an example of a situation in which it would apply.

I don't consider this topic to be "closed" - there are a few other considerations that come to mind, and I am not confident that this logic is complete or entirely accurate, though I expect that this will suffice for most purposes.

Nature of Obligation

My aim is to consider the circumstances in which the standards of ethics may conclude that an individual is obligated to act for the benefit of another party. This tends to be a difficult subject, and the focal point of much consideration and argument, and a fundamental consideration to ethics.

To begin, obligation is the focal point of ethics. When a person acts alone, undertaking an action that has no appreciable impact on other parties, the question of ethics do not arise. A person is expected to act in ways beneficial to himself as a matter of course. A person is entitled to act in ways that are harmful to himself, though this may seem irrational to an observer. The consideration of "right" and "wrong" are practical matters, nothing more.

The consideration of ethics begins only when a second party enters the stage, and the consequences of the actions undertaken by an actor impact this second person. They may have a direct impact, in which any harm or benefit immediately arises from the action, or an indirect impact, in that the consequences of the action alter the situation in a way that is ultimately beneficial or harmful to the other party by virtue of the change in the environment.

The fundamental question of ethics, then, is whether it is "right" for a person to take an action due to the consequences it may have for other parties. This gives rise to the notion that the individual is required to consider the impact to other parties before undertaking any course of action.

And at this, a working definition of obligation can be derived: obligation is the requirement for an individual to consider the consequences of an action to other parties in advance of undertaking that action.

While this may be tedious, my sense is that it might give rise to problems if the goal of obligation were not fully explored: given that the options are to act or refrain from acting, and given that the consequences may be beneficial or harmful, there are four possible outcomes (1):

Obligation to act in ways that are harmful to others

The notion that a person is obliged to harm others seems entirely absurd at first, and on further consideration it remains largely so. The only exception I can presently conceive is in reaction. It might be argued that acting in a way to harm another person effects restitution (when the actor seeks to be compensated for the harm done by the previous actions of another person) and a punitive value (when the harm inflicted on another is a punishment that is intended to dissuade them from repeating the action that elicited the reactive punishment).

Punitive action is a topic best suited for political and legal debate, so I expect to avoid it in future. While the notion of restitution seems germane to the topic of business, in that an individual who has performed a service and not received payment may feel obligated to obtain compensation in a manner that could be perceived as harmful to the other party, the primary interest in doing so is not to harm the other party, but to gain the benefit to which they feel entitled. This may bear further consideration in that context, but not in the sense of obligation.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are helpful to others

This notion seems unusual, though not quite as absurd as the former, in that the typical argument is based on the premise that when it is possible to help others, the obligation is to render aid rather than withhold it (which will be addressed later). Even so, my sense is that there are instances in which a person may be obligated to refrain from acting in a way that benefits other parties.

One instance in which it is logical to feel reluctance to render assistance is in the context of education or mentoring. The belief that another person will not learn a skill or be inclined to develop the facility for performing a task if another party intercedes to perform tasks in his benefit does seem to be rational. In this sense, the actor's intention in refraining from assisting is positive in its intent: to give to the other person not the immediate benefit they may wish to have, but instead a more long-term benefit of learning to accomplish the task for themselves.

Another instances in which it is logical to refrain from rendering assistance is in a situation where the actor accepts the limitation of his own knowledge. That is to say, the actor is uncertain whether the action he undertakes will render a benefit the other party desires without doing greater harm. In plainer terms, there is the obligation not to interfere in situations where you lack the information, experience, and knowledge to be sufficiently certain that the action will have a beneficial outcome.

Obligation to act in ways that are helpful to others

Under certain circumstances, the notion that a person may be obligated to undertake an action for the benefit of another party seems reasonable. However, the precise circumstances are a subject of much debate, and bear far more scrutiny that I can give them in the content of the present post.

I expect there will be many meditations in which the notion of this obligation is considered, and I can think of no general principle that I can state at the present time, without more intense consideration.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others

It seems to me that the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others is virtually an axiom. "Doing no harm" seems a requirement for considering an action to be wholly ethical. An individual is entitled act in a way that harms himself if he so desires, and obligated to suffer the negative consequences of his own actions is a matter of course, but I can find no rational basis the notion that an individual is obligated to harm others.

Exceptions to this principle seem absurd: the notion that a party would seek to obligate another to undertake an action in which the sole consequences would be to harm them would be the equivalent of acting, by proxy, to harm themselves - which would fall into the defined categories as altruistic, sacrificial, or insane.

Notes

1. I have conveniently omitted from the consideration above instances in which an action has no consequences for others, or instances in which the consequences do not result in appreciable harm or benefit to others. I don't wish to take these off the table, as a number of false dilemmas arise from the exclusion of the possibility of actions that have no appreciable consequence. However, I believe they can rightly be excluded from consideration in the context of obligation.

Categorization of Consequences

In considering the consequences of an action to self versus to others, there seem to be nine possible outcomes when comparing the consequences to self to the consequences to others, which can be schematized thus:

	Benefit Others	No Consequence	Harm Others
Benefit Self	Benevolent	Self-Interested	Questionable
No Consequence	Charitable	Inconsequential	Sociopathic
Harm Self	Altruistic	Sacrificial	Irrational

As a note, I'm not sure if the labels I've given to these categories are entirely accurate, but found that attempting to use some neutral indicator was either verbose ("actions that benefit the self while having no consequence to others") or incomprehensible ("Type BN" or "Type 2"). This may bear further consideration - but for the present, the intention is to consider the interplay of the outcomes.

And while it's been noted before, it bears repeating that "no consequence" is shorthand for "no significant consequence," in that all actions have some consequence, but the consequence has no significance under most circumstances.

I've considered the merits of considering each of these nine categories, in and of themselves, but have decided not to do so at the present time. It seems a bit overly oriented with details that may be inconsequential. I may change my mind about that later, but for now:

Actions that have no consequences for any party, called "inconsequential" in the table above, do not merit further inquiry. An action that has no consequence cannot be assessed as good or bad, but might reasonably be called a waste of time and resources. Perhaps the only interest to ethics is the choice of an inconsequential action over a beneficial alternative, but even that seems of little interest

Actions that have a benefit to one or both parties (benevolent, charitable, or self-interested) but cause no harm to anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "good" without the need to meditate upon it further.

Actions that harm one or both parties (sacrificial, sociopathic, or irrational) but precipitate no benefit for anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "bad" without the need to meditate upon it further.

The altruistic action, which harms self and benefits others, merits some consideration. However, even this is of limited interest to ethics, as the decision is entered into freely by the actor, who is just as entitled to act to his own detriment as he is to act in his own benefit. In situations where a third party attempts to manipulate or deceive an individual into harming himself for their benefit, ethics is applied to the action of manipulation or deceit separate from the altruistic action.

The category of greatest interest to ethics are those actions deemed questionable - where an actor seeks to benefit himself and accepts that there are negative consequences to others. The degree to which this is acceptable or unacceptable to ethics is largely a matter of degree. By the strictest application of ethics, a person is required to do no harm to others, even if this means foregoing any benefit he might gain by doing so. By a more liberal interpretation, a person may be forgiven for the harm to others if the harm done is of lesser degree than the benefit - but even in that interpretation, it is conceded that the action is essentially unethical.

Prioritizing the Benefit to Others

When an individual acts in self-interests, the prioritization of his interests is weighted according to the immediacy of benefit to self. When an individual acts in the interest of other parties, there are two considerations to be made: the level of benefit to a given party and the choice of one party's benefits over another's.

The first consideration, the choice among benefits to a single party, would seem to be easily resolved, as the same method of prioritization can be applied: if your intention is to benefit a starving man, his needs are best addressed by a meal. Giving him "job training" to improve his lot may be argued to have a greater long-term impact on alleviating his condition, by better equipping him to serve his future needs (second-level security need) but his immediate condition (first-level survival need) is of greater importance.

The second consideration, determining which of multiple others is to be served, seems more arbitrary: the need of a person five feet away is no greater or less than that of a person five thousand miles away. The choice to help the closer party is often a practical matter: it is easier. And while the easy choice is not necessarily the most ethical, it is often the most efficient. To provide assistance to a party at a distance requires transportation (the cost of which may make the donation impracticable), transportation will take time (by the time help arrives, it may no longer be needed), etc. The impact upon ethics is in the effect of distance upon the conditions and probable consequences of the decision.

When it is just as practical to serve the needs of one party as the needs of another, it becomes a question of the actor's own values. In particular, the benefit to others may be regarded as a third-level of fourth-level benefit to self.

The third-level benefit to self is service to social needs, and it seems rational that the greater the service to self, the more one is vested in the interests of the other party. Hence, a person is more likely to act in the interests of a member of their immediate family than a stranger, a member of their community rather than an outsider, a member of their own country than an immigrant. This is not merely an emotional decision, but a rational one, in that the benefit is to bestowed upon a "closer" party because the actor has greater personal interest in their welfare, in that the relationship with that person has greater potential future value to self.

The fourth-level benefit to self is an interest in gaining esteem, which is very often the unspoken motive behind charitable or altruistic actions. A person provides benefits to others so that other individuals (including, but not limited to, the individual to whom they granted the benefit) will be more inclined to regard them as a noble person and worthy of their deference. This is evident in the desire to be charitable in a conspicuous way - not merely to perform an act of charity, but to make it known to others that they have acted charitably, and therefore to grant them the esteem that was the self-serving motive of being charitable.

The exception would seem to be an anonymous donation that benefits others, but my sense is this is still related to gaining esteem - only in this instance, it is self-esteem. It is not important to others to recognize the charitable action, but the individual experiences positive feelings about themselves for having undertaken a charitable action. In the absence of any other benefit to self, charitable action is valued because it "feels good" to be charitable, regardless of whether the action actually benefited anyone else. This phenomenon explains why so many people donate to charity without checking to see that the funds they donate are being used for the purpose for which they were provided - they have reaped the reward of self-esteem, which was their prime motivation.

In acting for the benefits of others, an person who is rational and ethical will evaluate these various factors to come to a decision about which action to undertake, though my sense is there is quite a bit of interplay among the various factors. For example, if it is a choice between granting a benefit to a party that in a manner that would grant the actor greater esteem and a more distant one to who is in greater need, the consideration of the various factors may not be logically or mathematically precise.

Motivation to Act for the Benefit of Others

Given that action is motivated by the desire to effect a benefit and that it can be taken for granted that an individual will act in self-interest, there remains the potential for an individual to act to effect a benefit for others.

There seems to be an imperative in Western culture to act for the benefits of others. This quality is evident much of historical philosophy and the contemporary philosophy that derives from historical bases. Much of which seeks to define ethics in a societal rather than a social context - the difference being that a "societal" approach to ethics considers the individual as having less value than the group and must therefore self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, whereas the "social" approach to ethics acknowledges that an individual is entitled to act for his own benefit but consider any negative impact to others as undesirable consequence.

Likewise, there is a notion that a truly altruistic person disregards their own needs and safety in order that their actions might benefit other parties - often vaguely defined as a "society" to which he is subordinate. This strikes me as a hollow notion, and one most often used in an unethical manner: to subordinate others to the service of an imaginary group (mainly, the church or the state) in order to skew their logic to serve the purpose of the individual to serving the interests of whomever is seeking to motivate/manipulate them.

Proponents of societal ethics tend to represent social ethics as being opposed to society - that acting in self-interest is done with disregard for the welfare of others - and therefore an individual who does not subordinate themselves to service of the society is anti-social, perhaps even to the degree of being sociopathic or seeking primarily to harm others. This is propaganda.

The social approach to ethics accepts that individuals will act in their own interests, but includes the benefit of others as a benefit to self, and proposes an ethic of action that does not necessarily exclude service to others or disregard their welfare. Considering that the motivation of the individual stems from the needs of the individual, any "other" party may be considered as a third- or fourth- level need of the self.

Returning to Maslow, the higher-level needs that an individual is motivated to serve derive from their interaction and relationship with other individuals.

A third-level need, called a "social" need recognizes that man is a social creature, and is motivated to pursue mutually-beneficial relationships with other individuals (who are expected to be motivated by the mutually-beneficial nature of the relationship). The mutually-beneficial nature of the relationship is key to the motivation of the individual: if there is a social connection from which the individual receives no benefit, there is no motivation to establish and preserve that relationship.

The fourth-level need, called an "esteem" need, is also evident in a social context: the desire to gain esteem exists only within a social context. This is achieved only though service to others, as "esteem" is granted to members of a group who are seen to be of greatest service to the group. There is therefore a motivation for an individual to act in ways that achieve benefits to others.

The fifth-level needs tend to be vaguely defined, but they also strike me as being social in nature: a person is "actualized" in their growth within a society and the positive impact they have upon it. In a loose sense, it can be said that a person is motivated to reap the psychological rewards of acting to achieve a "better world" in a sense that is related to long-term benefits and large-scale impact.

The main difference between societal ethics and social ethics is that, in societal ethics, Maslow's hierarchy is inverted (or perhaps subverted) to suggest that the individual must first seek to achieve a "better world" before concerning himself with his basic (survival) needs, whereas in social ethics, the good of society is a recognized as a need, but is prioritized at the proper level of interest: an individual is motivated to act in the interest of his own survival before acting to achieve the higher-level goals, which is in line with Maslow's theory.