Entitlement of the Actor

Having considered the potential positive and negative consequences of an action to the actor himself, it has been concluded that an action that has no consequences for any other party is not within the scope of ethics to evaluate.

There is, however, a precipitating (or perhaps underlying) premise: that an individual is entitled to undertake action in his own welfare, which include undertaking actions that may ultimately be detrimental to his own welfare.

Objectively, it may seem that there are situations in which another party may wish to intervene in order to prevent an individual from undertaking action that poses a threat to his own welfare, or even to compel an individual to undertake an action that would improve his own welfare, but intervention is ethically questionable, as any party other than the actor does not have sufficient knowledge of the intentions of the actor and is likely to be mistaken about whether the action in question is intended to be beneficial or harmful to the actor.

In situations where another party's own welfare is at stake, the desire to restrict the actions of others can be based in a desire to defend against a threat to their own welfare. As such, the act of intervention is pursuit of personal interest, in which instance the person who means to intervene must consider the ethics of their own (intervening) action.

In situations where this other party's interests are not at stake, there is no justification for intervening. There remains an emotional motivation to act, the notion that another party will feel a sense of regret at their failure to have intervened, but emotion is no basis for logic (though again, it may in some instances be a cue that the logic bears greater scrutiny), nor are the consequences of not acting to be equivocated with the consequences of undertaking to act.

Actions that Harm the Actor

In the previous post, actions that have consequences only to the actor were considered to be ethically neutral. However, this was considered only in the positive perspective: actions that have benefits to the actor. It may be interesting to consider this in a negative perspective as well: if an individual undertakes an action that harms only himself, is this ethical?

This is not an expected behavior: that a person might act in order to do harm to himself seems absurd and irrational, and is one of the key criteria by which a person is to be declared insane by the standards of psychology. At yet, it is within the realm of possibility.

Strictly speaking, if the harm a person does to himself is of no consequence to any other party, this action remains beyond the scope of ethics. However, returning to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, our social connections to others may be perceived as a third-level need of our own. Therefore, by harming himself, the individual may also be creating a consequence to other parties, and the action is no longer beyond the scope of ethics: a person who harms oneself is to do harm to those who are dependent on their social connection to that person.

It that sense, the action of doing harm to self has a consequence of doing harm to others. If no benefit is to be achieved by harming oneself, then the action is entirely negative, hence unethical.

One question that precipitates is: whether others are obliged or even entitled to intervene in a situation where a person seems to be acting in a way that is harmful to himself. The difficulty in accepting this obligation as a necessity is that the perception may be incorrect.

There are situations in which a person may seem to be acting in a way that is harmful to self to an observer who is unaware of the actor’s intentions. For example, if an individual is seen to be throwing away food – tossing grain into the dirt – it is likely his intention is not what is immediately apparent (to waste food that is essential to his first-level survival needs), but to achieve a different objection (to sow seeds as a means to grow food for his future survival needs). In that way, intervention is a presumption on the part of one person that they know the full intent of another individuals actions.

When there is a social connection between individuals, the motivation of another person to intervene for the welfare of another person seems reasonable, though there remains an obligation to be diligent in ensuring that the intent of the action is understood. But even then, there remains the liklihood that the person who seeks to intervene is putting their own interests before those of the other party.

When there is no social connection between the individuals, the motivation of the other person to intervene is less defensible. Even when it is well-intentioned, it is an interference in the lives of others without any rational justification for doing so. To suggest that a person is entitled to interfere with the lives of others with whom they have no connection may be arguable, but this strikes me as a matter of politics.

Another question that precipitates is: whether an individual is obliged to undertake action that is detrimental to themselves for the benefit of other parties. That is to say, when the welfare of one party is considered to be more important than that of another, and the latter is ethically required to self-sacrifice for the welfare of those who are better or more deserving than himself.

At face value, this is an deplorable notion, that is often at the basis of exploitation: the slave, being less important than the master, is to be held to self-sacrifice for the welfare of his master. But at the same time, it is said to be honorable of an individual to self-sacrifice for the welfare of others. I strongly suspect that this is the machination of those who wish to create a situation in which others are expected to sacrifice for their welfare, and to promulgate such an action as noble or honorable is propaganda. However, I’ll avoid accepting that as a firm conclusion until such time as I have put further consideration into the conflict of interests between multiple parties.

For the present, I believe that I can rest in the conclusion that an action that causes harm only to the actor is beyond the scope of ethics, that the obligation or entitlement to intervene is a separate matter, and the obligation to self-sacrifice another still.

Ethics in Social Context

Another extrapolation from Maslow is that action is motivated by the needs or interests of the actor, and that ethics is considered in terms of the impact of that action in terms of its consequence to other parties. In other words, ethics is not primarily concerned with the self-interest of the actor.

It is expected that a person will act in pursuit of their own values, and in instances where there is no consequence to any other party, ethics does not apply. When a person is motivated by their own hunger to eat, the act of eating is not of any ethical significance whatsoever – it is merely the satisfaction of his own needs, of consequence to no other party.

That is not to say that any benefit to self is to be excluded or discounted from consideration. The fact that the act of eating renders a benefit to the actor remains as a motivation to act. The decision is still rational, and it is practical, but the lack of benefit or detriment to another party makes it of negligible interest to ethics.

Ethics is concerned with the social context of action – the consequences of an action to other parties. I cannot go so far as to say “to society,” as “society” lacks definition and includes parties for whom an action has no consequences. And again, if there are no consequences, there is nothing for ethics to consider in determining the nature of the action in terms of good or evil.

It’s also noted that needs are taken for granted, and a motivation to fill a need is presumed. This is the rationale for action, which is of key interest to ethics. It seems pointless to apply reason to evaluate an action that is not the result of a reasoned decision, though ethics may castigate the neglect of considering consequences before undertaking action.

It is also presumed that some action will be taken to address a need. A person who is hungry will seek to satisfy that need by eating, a prerequisite of which is obtaining food. In such an instance, ethics is not primarily concerned with the satisfaction of the need for the actor (to eat being neutral), but with the actions undertaken in obtaining food, insofar as they affect other parties.

That is to say that the person will eat, as a practical matter, and the function of ethics is to help him to identify the course of action, among the various possibilities, by which he will satisfy this requirement. It is the means, rather than the action, that are evaluated with the intention of making a rational decision, given that the individual is motivated to undertake some form of action to fill that need.

And to return to the original point, that if the action an individual undertakes to fill a need has no impact on any other party, his actions are of no interest to ethics.

Ethics and Values

I have accepted as a premise that the function of ethics is to guide action in consideration of the consequences: that an action that precipitates a positive consequence is good, and an action that achieves a negative consequence is bad, and that the evaluation of the ethics of the decision to act relies upon the whole of the consequences of that action. But this remains vague: the definition "good" and "bad" are unclear.

My sense is that "good" is related to the achievement of a value or a goal - and will for the present consider the two to be analogous, as goals precipitate from values. That an action achieves a goal is merely a question of practicality or efficiency, and as such the value from which that goal is derived is of the greater significance.

Returning to Maslow, the value of primary concern is life. Any action that preserves life is of the highest interest to an individual, and the more immediate the impact, the higher the priority of the interest. Upon further reflection it seemed that this could also be of service to ethics, as existence itself would precede the accomplishment of any other end.

When ethics is considered in the context of religion, the value of human life is subordinate to spiritual matters. This is still a consideration of man's existence, though in the non-corporeal form of a spirit or a soul. And in that context, the harm done to a person in their corporeal life is justified by the benefit that an action might have to the condition of their non-corporeal form.

I do not care to pursue that line of thought further, as it is not germane to the ethics of business, whose sole concern is the present reality rather than the notion of a non-corporeal existence, though it bears mentioning as a matter of differentiating the ethics of business from the ethics of religion, as well as the ethical considerations that an individual may choose to make for religious reasons.

And while it is my intention to hold "life" as the root of value, with all other values being derived from it, it's also worth mentioning that existence is not universally or eternally compelling. There may be instances in which the conditions of existence cause an individual to devalue existence and, specifically, to pursue its opposite.

The most common incidence of this inversion is considered in the context of health and wellness. Faced with a physical condition in which "to live" means an existence of torment and despair, it seems plausible that one may come to the conclusion that life holds no value and, instead, seek to put an end to one's own existence.

It is not my intent to explore that topic at this time. It may have special interest to the healthcare industry, but under normal circumstances, most decisions are made in a context where life is the primary value, and instances in which it is desirable to end one's existence constitute an unusual and exceptional set of circumstances that cannot provide guidance for decision-making outside of those situations.

Prioritization of Interests

Consideration of the hierarchy of needs as a basis for the prioritization of interests would suggest that the most ethical decision is driven by the utility to the lowest level of need. But I have a sense it’s not quite so simple.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences only to himself, it is plausible to consider that the definite sacrifice of a higher priority in order to definitely achieve a lower priority is irrational. (To be considered separately: do ethics even apply in such a situation?) However, in advance of an action being undertaken, the outcomes are not definite, and the decision-maker must consider probability.

In that sense, an individual may perceive that the chances of success at serving the lower priority are such that it is worth the risk to the higher priority. For example, entry into many social groups (a third-level priority) require an individual to undergo an initiation that poses an immediate threat to their well-being (a first-level priority). In is not unusual, nor necessarily irrational, for an individual to accept that risk.

The risk involved in investing is of a similar nature: while both the amount risked and the amount gained are a second-level priority (wealth, as a means to satisfy future needs), an individual may assess that the benefit of increasing their wealth is worth the risk of the amount they risk in the investment.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences to himself and another person, interests are viewed from the perspective of the decision maker. That is to say that a first-level priority of one party (their immediate need) is at best a third-level priority when the consequences to them is made by someone else (presuming they value their social connection to another party).

The ethics of survival puzzles generally play upon this principle: a person who has the authority an ability to decide on a disposition of a resource that is immediately needed for himself and another party, it is presumed that the inclination of the decision-maker is to serve his self-interest first. From a purely functional or purely psychological perspective, this may be entirely justified, but it is not necessarily acceptable from an ethical perspective.

When an individual makes a decision that has no consequences to himself, and the benefit or harm is only to other parties, similar factors are taken into consideration. When the benefit and harm are to be done to a single party, the decision-maker is to consider the value of each and the risks to be considered (in effect, to make as “good” a decision for the other party as he would for himself).

When the benefit is granted to one party at the expense of another, the decision-maker who is motivated entirely by self-interest can be expected to consider the value of each party to himself, and comes to a decision based on the value he places on his future relationship with each of the two parties. However, if the decision-maker has no existing relationship and expects to have no future relationship, his decision is arbitrary.

Much of this bears further consideration – but insofar as the prioritization of interests is concerned, it would seem acceptable to accept Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a basis for rational decision-making when the benefit and harm implicit in a decision pertain to a single party. However, it is not a complete answer to the dilemma faced by a decision-maker who is weighing consequences that benefit one party and harm another.

Maslow Reconsidered

The primary problem in applying Maslow's hierarchy to ethics is that Maslow explores the motivations of the individual to act in his own benefit, whereas ethics most often considers the effect of actions upon others.

That said, there are a few aspects of Maslow's theory that seem compelling:

Primarily, that interests can be prioritized by a hierarchy, some being more important than others. This seems entirely rational, and has value to ethics in overcoming some to the problems inherent in binary systems of ethics - in which a consequence is labeled as good or bad without a sense of the degree of importance or impact.

Second, that the importance of an interest is relative to the achievement of a core value. In Maslow's hierarchy, it is clear that the chief "need" toward which an individual is motivated is life itself - in the sense of the survival of the individual. I have a sense that the same can be said of ethics - not only in the role that values play, but also in the identification of life itself as the root value, from which all other values are derived.

Third, and this is admittedly an indirect extrapolation, that the motivation of an individual to serve his own interests is entirely a matter of psychology that has little importance or interest to ethics. Said another way, ethics takes it for granted that an individual will act in his own interests, to serve his own needs, and that this is of no consequence to ethics. Instead, ethics focuses on the consequences of an action to others, and one of the chief ethical dilemmas is in considering when the harm done to others is justified by the benefit to self.

Each of these three aspects merit further consideration.

Maslow's Hierarchy

I've been stewing over the previous post and have found it difficult to proceed further along the topic without more detailed consideration of needs, desires, and interests. Unable to define them from a purely philosophical perspective, I defer to psychology.

It merits mention that philosophy and psychology are closely inter-related, such that one often intrudes on the other, and generally, the consequences are less than optimal (a psychologist's take on philosophy, and vice-versa, tend to be sloppy and inaccurate), and so it's important to state that my intent here is not to redefine psychology, but borrow upon it until a purely philosophical answer can be found.

Even so, it cannot be borrowed without some modification. Primarily, Maslow's theory is considered to be a hierarchy of needs, and I find that the distinction of "need" from "desire" is hazy at best, and moreover, it is of no consequence to ethics. And so, my intent is to translate Maslow's hierarchy of needs into a hierarchy of interests, and set aside the classification of an interest as a need or a desire.

Maslow's theory was that there are a broad array of human needs that can be depicted as a hierarchy, such that the lowest level of need is of primary interest to the individual, and that it is generally the case that the individual will be inclined to fill his lowest level of need before seeking to fulfill needs on a higher level.

This would translate to the subject of ethics as the motivation to serve an interest (or "satisfy a need"), and to prioritize certain interests over others (addressing basic needs before seeking to fulfill higher ones).

The lowest level of the hierarchy, hence the highest level of priority to motivation, are "physiological" needs, which arise from the immediate necessity of sustaining life: the need to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, and react to medical emergencies that pose immediate threat to life and well-being. The needs at this level can be further prioritized by their immediacy: the need to breathe being more pressing than the need to eat.

At the next level are the needs that Maslow considered to be essential to safety and security. These are still based on physiological needs, but seek to fulfill future needs rather than immediate ones: the need to avoid injury or treat medical conditions that are not an immediate threat, the need to establish stores of food and water for future consumption, etc.

The next level are social needs, which are also derived from physiological needs, but in the context of other people. Specifically, the individual is motivated to enter into relationships with others that will help him to fulfill his future needs more efficiently: family, neighbors, community, employer, etc. It is at this level that the motivation begins to become blurred, as psychology insists that an individual has a "need" to belong to social units that is not directly related to his ability to fulfill his physiological needs.

The next level of needs pertain to esteem, which is a purely psychological consideration. This deals with the emotional fulfillment of the individual: self-esteem, the respect of others, confidence in his abilities, and a sense of achievement.

The highest level of needs pertain to self-actualization: the development of abilities that did not previously exist, and are not directly related to physiological needs. Though it seems to me that this is related to esteem (a person gains abilities to increase the same factors, respect, confidence, sense of achievement), I may be overlooking the reason for differentiating them.

From a perspective of ethics, the first three levels of Maslow's hierarchy are acceptable in their objectivity. I do not think it could be argued that these "needs" represent genuine and objectively valid motivations.

However, the purely psychological elements of the highest two levels (and the psychological rather than physiological element of the third) are more difficult to accept as a basis for objective evaluation. I don't dispute that humans are motivated by such things, but find it difficult to include them in objective assessment of interests as they are tautologies (a person desires to belong to a group simply because they desire to belong to a group).

Borrowing upon Maslow's hierarchy, I will accept for the time being that there are four "levels" of interest, in order of highest to lowest priority:

1. Interests that are served in order to satisfy immediate physiological needs
2. Interests that are served in order to directly impact the ability to meet future physiological needs
3. Interests that are served in order to directly impact the ability to meet future physiological needs by means of others
4. Interests that are served for reasons unrelated to physiological needs

I have a sense that this will hold up under a liberal amount of scrutiny, and will suffice for the evaluation of ethics in most situations.

Motivation and Benefit

Previous consideration of action has implied, but may not have directly stated, that actions are undertaken out of a desire to effect a change in conditions. It also seems reasonable to assert that this desire is to effect a change that will result in an improvement of benefit to a certain party.

While this does not discount the possibility that the motivation might be to have a negative or detrimental effect, my sense is that this is seldom (if ever) the motivation of a rational individual - rather, that the negative consequences of an action are side effects rather than the primary motivation.

The benefit to a certain party is also of significance: it is unlikely that there exists an outcome that is universally positive. At best, it will have a positive effect for some, and no appreciable effect upon others. In some instances, generating a positive effect for some may be damaging to others.

This merits consideration, but is beyond the scope of the present consideration: that in assessing ethics, we must account for the complete scope of consequences for all parties that are affected, but the motivation to undertake an action is specific to the interests of a given party.

Germane to the present consideration: what constitutes a benefit? Chiefly benefits are consider in the positive effect on the party under consideration, but a decision may also be motivated by the desire to avoid negative effects. This seems an important distinction, but the effect on motivation are fundamentally the same: whether it is to achieve something "new" or perpetuate the status quo, it is still a benefit.

There also seems to be some distinction between need and desire, though this often falls along the same lines, with a "need" being defined as a motivation to perpetuate the status quo and a "desire" being defined as a motivation to effect a beneficial change to the status quo. Again, there appears to be little difference to motivation.

There also seems to be the sense that a "need" is more pressing than a "desire," and therefore to be automatically granted a higher degree of importance as a motivational factor. My sense is that this is a matter of psychology rather than philosophy - and while it may merit consideration, the two still remain equivalent in the consideration of ethics.

It's also worth noting that benefit and detriment remain subjective concepts - though my sense is that it should be fairly straightforward to classify a specific outcome as good or bad, and that people will generally be in agreement, this remains entirely subjective and shallow in its consideration.

In the end, it seems this meditation has yielded more questions than answers.

Relationships

Another notion that adds complexity to evaluating business transactions is the notion of the "relationship" - specifically, it is possible for a transaction to take place in isolation (a one-time sale to a customer with whom the business will never interact again), but it is more common for transactions to be done in the context of an ongoing relationship (the business sells to the same customers, again and again, over time).

The notion of relationship is important to both parties. It is convenient and efficient, for a customer to be able to obtain the same good from the same vendor, and for a business to sell to repeat customers. However, it is more important from the perspective of a business, as future sales ensure the perpetuation of the organization, which is a tacit goal of most organizations.

I would also posit that it is beneficial to ensuring the consideration of ethics: a business that seeks to make repeated sales, over time, can generally be counted on to treat its customers better than a fly-by-night operation. The latter seeks to have a single interaction, as it has no future interest in the consequences to the customer of the present transaction, whereas the former realizes it must satisfy the customer as a means of obtaining their future business.

One of the weaknesses I have noticed in many studies of this topic is a narrow focus on the immediate transaction, without consideration of the long-term interests of both the customer and the business. The limitation of this consideration is not invalid, and is in fact appropriate for a one-time transaction - but my sense is that this is less common than having an ongoing relationship.

I also have the sense that this is a relatively recent consideration: especially in the field of marketing, the notion of an ongoing relationship seems to be a relatively recent one - or perhaps the popularity of the notion is only increased of late, as it seems to be that many people in business have considered relationships long before it was fashionable to do so. As such, the notion of relationship and its impact on ethics may be a largely unexplored topic.

Transactions

Thus far, the notion of "action" has largely been considered as precipitating from the independent decision of a single party. However, the context of business is a social one, and seldom ever involves a single party's decision to undertake an action without considering the expected actions of others.

A decision is made to sell a good, but this is based on the expectations that others will decide to purchase it. Hence the decision to sell must consider the factors that are taken into account in the decision to purchase, which is made by another party. In this sense, the action of the business is influenced by the perceived future action of the intended customer.

The same can be said of virtually any action undertaken by a business - and "virtually" is a concession to the possibility that there may be some action that is taken independently, though I am presently unable to conceive of such a thing.

The transactional nature of business adds yet another level of complexity to the consideration of ethics in this context: when an item is offered for sale, and it is assessed that the selling of the item is unethical, is the ethical failure to be ascribed to the business that decided to sell the item or the customer who decided to purchase it?

My sense is that this is an important consideration, and is inherent in most real-world situations in which the subject of ethics is raised. However, for the present, I feel it's necessary to separate the two decisions - to treat the decision to sell and the decision to buy as two separate decisions, each of which is made by a different party, each of which must be considered in and of itself.

There are dependencies between them, but it becomes a chicken-and-egg argument: would the customer decide to buy if the item were not for sale, or would the business decided to sell if there were no consumer demand? My sense is that either may be considered true, depending on context.