I’ve started this blog as a meditation on ethics in the context of business. Having suffered through a number of books on the topic, and having found them entirely unsatisfactory, I'm left with the sense that anyone interested in the topic is left to sort things out for themselves. Hence, this blog.

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I expect to focus on fundamentals for a while, possibly several weeks, before generating much material of interest. See the preface for additional detail on the purpose of this blog.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Actions that Harm the Actor

In the previous post, actions that have consequences only to the actor were considered to be ethically neutral. However, this was considered only in the positive perspective: actions that have benefits to the actor. It may be interesting to consider this in a negative perspective as well: if an individual undertakes an action that harms only himself, is this ethical?

This is not an expected behavior: that a person might act in order to do harm to himself seems absurd and irrational, and is one of the key criteria by which a person is to be declared insane by the standards of psychology. At yet, it is within the realm of possibility.

Strictly speaking, if the harm a person does to himself is of no consequence to any other party, this action remains beyond the scope of ethics. However, returning to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, our social connections to others may be perceived as a third-level need of our own. Therefore, by harming himself, the individual may also be creating a consequence to other parties, and the action is no longer beyond the scope of ethics: a person who harms oneself is to do harm to those who are dependent on their social connection to that person.

It that sense, the action of doing harm to self has a consequence of doing harm to others. If no benefit is to be achieved by harming oneself, then the action is entirely negative, hence unethical.

One question that precipitates is: whether others are obliged or even entitled to intervene in a situation where a person seems to be acting in a way that is harmful to himself. The difficulty in accepting this obligation as a necessity is that the perception may be incorrect.

There are situations in which a person may seem to be acting in a way that is harmful to self to an observer who is unaware of the actor’s intentions. For example, if an individual is seen to be throwing away food – tossing grain into the dirt – it is likely his intention is not what is immediately apparent (to waste food that is essential to his first-level survival needs), but to achieve a different objection (to sow seeds as a means to grow food for his future survival needs). In that way, intervention is a presumption on the part of one person that they know the full intent of another individuals actions.

When there is a social connection between individuals, the motivation of another person to intervene for the welfare of another person seems reasonable, though there remains an obligation to be diligent in ensuring that the intent of the action is understood. But even then, there remains the liklihood that the person who seeks to intervene is putting their own interests before those of the other party.

When there is no social connection between the individuals, the motivation of the other person to intervene is less defensible. Even when it is well-intentioned, it is an interference in the lives of others without any rational justification for doing so. To suggest that a person is entitled to interfere with the lives of others with whom they have no connection may be arguable, but this strikes me as a matter of politics.

Another question that precipitates is: whether an individual is obliged to undertake action that is detrimental to themselves for the benefit of other parties. That is to say, when the welfare of one party is considered to be more important than that of another, and the latter is ethically required to self-sacrifice for the welfare of those who are better or more deserving than himself.

At face value, this is an deplorable notion, that is often at the basis of exploitation: the slave, being less important than the master, is to be held to self-sacrifice for the welfare of his master. But at the same time, it is said to be honorable of an individual to self-sacrifice for the welfare of others. I strongly suspect that this is the machination of those who wish to create a situation in which others are expected to sacrifice for their welfare, and to promulgate such an action as noble or honorable is propaganda. However, I’ll avoid accepting that as a firm conclusion until such time as I have put further consideration into the conflict of interests between multiple parties.

For the present, I believe that I can rest in the conclusion that an action that causes harm only to the actor is beyond the scope of ethics, that the obligation or entitlement to intervene is a separate matter, and the obligation to self-sacrifice another still.

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