Causes of Ethical Failure

It is a simple matter, after the fact, to assess whether harm was done and accuse those who decided to act of having intended to create the outcome, or having failed to prevent it, of unethical behavior. While it may be entirely logical to conclude that the action caused harm, it cannot be taken for granted that this was the result of an ethical failure.

The notion of "ethical failure" is in contrast to the notion of "unethical behavior," in the same way that failing to act ethically is not to be equivocated with acting unethically - it is a false dichotomy. While it is not inconceivable that an individually would choose to act in an unethical manner, instances of unethical behavior are exceedingly rare, and it is often the result of poor analysis that one cannot identify the positive intention that precipitated negative consequences, and therefore assume the intentions were unethical.

Having considered the matter at some length, I have identified six causes of ethical failure. I don't expect that this is an exhaustive list, but it seems a good start:

1. Malicious Intent

The first cause of ethical failure as an intention to act in a way that causes harm. As noted above, this is a common accusation that seldom bears true, but the possibility that an individual would act with the sole intention of causing harm to others.

2. Ignorance

Ignorance is the cause of ethical failure when an action is undertaken without thoroughly examining the situation or considering the possible outcomes of the action. It seems to me that this is the most common cause of ethical failure, and the most difficult to address, given that human beings are not omniscient and cannot be expected to have perfect knowledge.

3. Indifference

Another cause of ethical failure is indifference, which primarily manifests itself as a disregard for the interests of third parties who may suffer harm as a result of the actions undertaken to generate a benefit for others. Indifference is differentiated from ignorance (above) in that the actor is aware that the action will cause harm, but proceeds regardless of this knowledge.

4. Prioritization Error

Errors of prioritization occur in situations in which an action has multiple impacts (benefits for some and damage to others) as well as opportunity costs (undertaking one action eliminates the possibility of undertaking others) and while the individual is neither ignorant of nor indifferent to the outcomes, an error is made in prioritization of the impacts.

5. Probability Error

In a situation in which outcomes are uncertain, and in which the actor has undertaken due diligence to identify the impact of an action, errors in the assessment of probability may occur. Generally, the potential for benefit is overestimated while the potential for harm is underestimated, and a decision to act is made upon a poor assessment of the probability of known outcomes.

6. Execution Error

Given that everything involved in the decision to act was attended, there remains the potential for errors to arise in the execution of a planned action. I am not entirely certain that this properly classified as a separate cause of ethical failure, or merely a temporal issue: if a decision to act is made, and new information is uncovered, is the insistence on pressing forward on the original plan a separate matter, or merely the discovery of an error at a later time (conditions have changed after the decision is made, but during the course of action).

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Again, this is unlikely to be a comprehensive list of the causes of ethical failure, and each of these items bears more intensive consideration, but it's a fair start at exploring the notion of ethical failure.

Goodwill versus Manipulation

It has been reasoned that when a person undertakes a unilateral action for the benefit of another party, he seeks to increase his goodwill in the context of a relationship, or his esteem outside the context of a relationship, thereby making others more inclined to regard him as a "good" person and less resistant to the notion of entering into a relationship that benefits his interests. But does this mean that the notions of goodwill and esteem are wrong or evil, or that a person who seeks to establish a positive reputation has sinister motives for doing so?

Not necessarily.

The notion of "society" is a complex web of connections and relationships among individuals who become, to some degree, dependent on one another. The notion that ethics is important at all derives from the function of ethics in guiding human interaction in the context of society. In this sense, establishing a positive reputation is a means toward facilitating the entry into relationships, is a means toward establishing relationships, is a means toward participating in relationships, is a means toward establishing and preserving society itself. It is therefore socially beneficial for an individual to pursue the self-interested objective of seeking to gain esteem and thereby improve his reputation.

However, a line is drawn between a genuine interest in improving one's esteem and performing an action that is used to obligate others to act in one's own benefit in a direct and specific way. The former is regarded as goodwill, the latter as manipulation.

It is noted that a relationship is based in mutual obligation, and mutual consent. A manipulative individual seeks to convince another person that they are in a relationship, even though the other party has not consented to participate, nor have they been in a position to negotiate the terms of that relationship, or of the exchange. It is most common, in instances of manipulation, for the manipulator to perform some trivial act at minimal cost to himself and demand, in return, that another party undertake considerable effort to repay the favor.

In the strictest sense of ethics, an individual is not responsible for fulfilling any unspoken expectation of others, but is held responsible for acting upon the communicated expectations of others in the context of a consensual relationship or mutual obligation. And so, when a person is the subject of manipulation, they are within their right to ignore the insistence of the other party that an obligation that was previously unspoken must be fulfilled due to the unsolicited action they have taken.

However, the act of presenting a demand for compensation is ethically separate from the action performed for the benefit of others. The original act that was done for the benefit of other parties is not inherently unethical, even if it is done with the specific motivation of benefiting one's own reputation or esteem, as it is taken for granted that an individual is expected to act in their own interests, and they are entitled to do so. But when that action is used as a rationale or justification for demanding that another party enter into a relationship, as a means of negating the voluntary consent, this demand (but not the original action) is unethical.

As such, an action undertaken to generate goodwill cannot be categorized as unethical - it may be considered ethical, or at worse, it can be considered to be ethically neutral.

Charitable Action and Esteem

In the context of relationships, there arose the notion of gratuitous action: an individual undertakes an action for the benefit of the other party, while having no expectation that the other party would undertake any action in return. However, the topic was set aside, as it is not unique to relationships: there are charitable actions performed for the benefit of others outside the context of a relationship as well.

The motivation to act in the benefit of others was previously matrixed against the motivation to act in self-interest, arriving at the classification of such actions as benevolent (the actor also benefits), charitable (no appreciable consequence to actor), or altruistic (the actor suffers harm).

In the context of a relationship, an action that benefits the other party is done for the sake of strengthening the relationship - and the relationship being of value to the actor, an action that might be characterized as charitable or altruistic could be argued to be merely benevolent, in that the motivation of the actor in providing an unsolicited benefit is to gain for themselves the preservation or reinforcement of a valued relationship.

Outside the context of a relationship, the same argument may be made: a person who acts for the benefit of others may not gain an immediate benefit for himself, but his service of another party gains their favor and thus increases the likelihood that the other party will be inclined to enter into a relationship with the actor in the future.

Even when a relationship with the benefactor of an action seems improbable, there remains the notion of esteem: a person who acts to benefit others without an apparent benefit to himself is seeking to improve his reputation as a "good" person, hence increase the likelihood that others will be inclined to enter into a relationship with the actor in the future.

This is clearly the motivation of conspicuous acts of charity: when a business performs charitable acts, it takes measures to ensure that these actions are publicized in order to gain the benefit of esteem. The same can be said of any individual whose charitable action is overt - the motivation to be charitable is to gain the benefit to their personal reputation as a means of increasing their esteem.

As such, any overt act of charity or altruism is not selfless, but is performed in self-interest, even though the benefit to self may be vague, will not be realized immediately, and may not be realized at all. The motivation of a charitable person is to gain esteem, a line of credit that they may draw upon in future.

It's noted that, in order to generate esteem, an act of charity or altruism must be overt. If no-one is aware of a charitable act, it produces no esteem for the actor. It could be argued that an anonymous act of charity is "truly" charitable, as the actor gains no benefit, or it could be argued that even an anonymous act of charity is done for the sake of self-esteem or self-actualization.

I don't intend to explore the notion of anonymous charitable action further. Since it is internal to an individual, its would seem to be of little relevance to social ethics.

Nature of Relationships

There are many kinds of relationships, each of which has its own nature. Even relationships of the same general kind may entail different responsibilities in different instances. So deriving general principles of ethics that apply to all relationships between all parties is complex and any conclusion would be wrought with inaccuracies. However, there seem to be some basic principles:

Primarily, relationships entail a sequence of transactions between two parties, as previously considered. In some instances, the serial transactions and the recurring obligations that arise are the only basis for the relationship, and the only responsibility of one party to another.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, a relationship may be based on a general notion that does not yield a definite and specific course of action: parties may enter into a relationship in which each is expected to act in the interests of the other, without a clear indication of what actions may be necessary in future, or which interests they are expected to serve, or what situations may arise, etc.

The more the two parties communicate their expectations, the clearer the course of action that each party must undertake to preserve the relationship. The notion that one party should understand, without communication, the expectations of the other, is the source of much debate and strife - though from an ethical perspective, a party is held responsible only for fulfilling those expectations of which he is aware. This is derived from the nature of a single transaction.

It's worth noting that a given culture may attempt to define the nature of certain relationships - that in a given country, religion, or group of people, a term such as "marriage" defines the terms of a relationship - but even this is mutable. Not all cultures define "marriage" in the same way, nor does every individual within a culture have the same understanding of the concept. It seems to me that deference to a cultural definition is not an acceptable substitute for communication, and that in entering into a relationship, the two parties bear the responsibility of negotiation of the terms their specific relationship, even if they are of the same culture.

There also seems to be, in the context of relationships, an expectation of gratuitous action - that is, that one party will act in the interests of the other while expecting nothing specific in return. My sense is that this is not a condition of the relationship, and can happen outside a relationship, and that the nature of this action is not affected by the existence of a relationship, so the notion of gratuitous action merits separate consideration.

Also similar to transactions, relationships are established by mutual consent. In some instances, it may be argued that a person is forced or compelled to participate in a relationship (for example, relationships of proximity are largely involuntary), though it would seem that the nature of involuntary relationships merits separate consideration from the voluntary relationship, which is more common.

Relationships are also maintained by mutual consent. If, at any time during the relationship, one party wishes to discontinue the relationship, then the relationship is ended. In some instances, there may be a sense of lingering obligations to another party to complete certain transactions in recompense for the other party's past action, but "breaking" the relationship otherwise liberates both parties from the obligation to future actions or any further involvement with one another.

Given this consideration, a basic definition of a "relationship" is derived as a set of terms by which two parties obligate themselves to act in one another's interest. This still strikes me as vague - but given that a relationship is a concept that may manifest itself in an infinite number of ways, the notion is inherently vague.

One-Time Commercial Transactions

In the consideration of business relationships, it seems to me that I left several loose threads in regards to isolated transactions. While it is reasonable that there are expectations in an ongoing relationship, and that violations of these expectations are violations of trust by virtue of their being grounded in experience, it is not clear whether these same ethical standards apply to a one-time (or first-time) commercial transaction.

Primarily, the nature of most transactions is voluntary. It may be argued that a person is "forced" to enter into a transaction against their will, but my expectation is that this is highly unusual, and the logic behind such an assertion highly dubious. In the context of business, both buyer and seller enter into the transaction voluntarily and may opt-out prior to obligating themselves to the transaction.

The obligation arises in the promise to perform an action in exchange for the promise of another party to perform an action in return. Before promises are exchanged, no obligation exists. It can even be argued that there is a period after the exchange of promises, but before either party has acted, in which the transaction can be voided - though this merits consideration.

The motivation of entering into a transaction is to obtain something of value. The fact that obtaining this objective requires the actor to provide something of value in return is a necessary condition of the transaction - the value each party receives from the other is their motive for undertaking an action at all.

The primary source of ethical consideration in transactions occurs when one party fails to deliver on its promise to the other party after the point at which they become obligated by the promise or initiation of action inherent in the transaction. A seller who accepts payment and does not deliver goods has acted unethically, as they have obtained the payment based on a false promise. A buyer who accepts goods and does not deliver valid payment has likewise failed to deliver on their ethical obligation.

The notion of failure to deliver an agreed-upon value when the value provided is a currency payment is relatively straightforward - though there is one wrinkle in the case of methods of payment whose value is received at a later time (the payer may tender counterfeit currency, a bad check, a fraudulent payment card, etc.) So long as the payment is accepted by another party (generally, a bank into which it is deposited), it can be said to be validated, and the obligation fulfilled unless it is later discovered to be fraudulent.

The notion of failure to deliver an agreed-upon value when the value provided is a material good or service is less straightforward. This is generally experienced from the buyer's role, in which an item received either does not have the qualities they expected, or does not deliver the ultimate value they expected (in that a good is used as a resource in later actions).

The ethical responsibility of the capability of an item to deliver the expected value is not entirely borne by the individual who provided the item, nor by the individual who accepted it, but is subject to the communication that occurs between them prior to entering into the transaction agreement.

It reasonable to hold the provider of the item responsible for the items failure to deliver any value that was communicated to the recipient in an unsolicited manner. If the provider indicates "this is a gold ring" and it later turns out to be brass, he has deceived the recipient into providing greater value than would have been given if the true nature of the item were known.

It is likewise reasonable to hold the provided responsible for providing complete and valid information in instances where expectations are communicated. If the recipient asks if the brass ring is gold and the provider says "yes," he has likewise provide false information. Even if he claims not to be aware, when he knows the ring to be made of brass, he has misled the recipient.

However, it is not reasonable to expect the provider of an item to know the interests or desires of the recipient that are not communicated to him, as he has no sense of the recipients beliefs about the quality of the item, nor any knowledge of the use to which the recipient intends to put the item, until it is communicated to him by the recipient.

In this sense, the recipient bears responsibility for initiating communication related to the item he will receive. There is no ethical transgression on the part of the provider for failure to provide information that has not been requested by the recipient - and the suggestion that the provider "should have known" what the recipient might have wanted to know bears little validity in the majority of instances.

The exception to this would be in the instance of a repeated transaction. In such instances, the provider of the item can reasonably be expected to understand, even without explicit communication, that the recipient expects the item to have the same qualities as a functionally identical item that was previously received from the same provider.

As a final note, it is worth mentioning that the notion of "caveat emptor" has largely been inverted in the competitive marketplace. The sellers of items often guarantee satisfaction while being unaware of the buyer's expectations, and refund purchases without arguing the reasons. This can be attributed to the seller's interest in retaining the buyer's business (outside the immediate transaction) or avoiding damage to their own reputation, which is a matter that bears separate consideration. However, the motivation of the seller to assume this responsibility is external to the immedaite transaction.

Trust and Business Relationships

It's been considered that the notion of a relationship between two parties adds complexity to their interactions, and that in its most basic sense, a relationship arises from a series of interactions (11/28) that create individual periods of obligation that overlap, giving the sense of an ongoing commitment between two parties. However, the notion that a relationship is something "more" than a series of transactions is not uncommon.

I'd like to explore this notion further, though at the same time to isolate it from the broader sense of relationships. The "relationship" between members of a community is of interest to ethics in a political sense, but is largely out of scope in the context of business (except in the relationship between business and community), and domestic and social relationships also seem to be beyond the scope of business ethics.

It's also my sense that any party who interacts with another party in the context of business could be said to have a relationship (stockholder, employee, executive, competitor, etc.), and these may merit separate consideration. For the present, I'll focus on the ongoing relationship between vendor and customer.

Not all commercial transactions take place in the context of a relationship. There is the notion of the one-time sale, in which the obligation of the buyer and seller end at a specific time, and the lack of a repeat purchase leaves both parties with the impression that they are "done" with the other.

Granted, there are various stipulations and expectations inherent in such a transaction, which may vary according to the nature of the good or service that is purchased, and there are instances in which a buyer may be dissatisfied with the transaction and seek redress. But provided that all goes well and both parties are satisfied, the transaction is completed.

One of the chief indicators of transactional satisfaction is the willingness of the buyer to repurchase from the same supplier (and conversely, the willingness of the seller to enter into a transaction with the buyer). While there may be some argument that satisfaction does not have to be complete in every way for this to occur, and that one or both parties may be accepting some compromises for the sake of convenience, it would be difficult to assert that parties who seek to repeat a transaction are significantly dissatisfied with their previous encounter.

The significant difference between an initial purchase and a rebuy transaction is that the latter implies a degree of trust. Each party assumes that the repeat transaction will be essentially the same as the one before, and has a reasonable expectation of the other party that the repurchase will be essentially the same as the initial purchase.

In this regard, it is reasonable to assert that the expectations of each party constitute an obligation on the part of the other party to undertake the responsibility to ensure the uniformity of the transaction to previous experience, or to provide information to the other party if it is foreseen that it will be different than before. To withhold or conceal information that would make the other party aware of a difference is a form of deception.

To some degree, the same can be said of the initial transaction, but the responsibility to provide information is not as compelling, as there is no previous experience between the parties. As they are unknown to one another, each assumes a certain level of risk in entering into a transaction, and should things go awry, there is no established trust to be violated. However, once this transaction is completed, it is reasonable for each party to assume future transactions will be measured against this standard.

It seems to me that this is what is meant by the notion of "trust" among parties who are in a relationship. In some situations, it may be arguable that trust creates additional obligations, but at the minimum, trust is based on consistency of transactions between two parties that routinely interact.

Duration of Obligation

With the exception of the imperative to do no harm, obligations are limited in their term. At some point, the obligation is fulfilled. In some instances, an obligation is fulfilled at the completion of an act; in others, it has greater longevity. Ultimately, it seems to reason that the duration of obligation is negotiable, but the duration varies greatly. The example of a commercial transaction is sued to illustrate this notion:

The obligation of the buyer is fulfilled upon receipt of payment. To split hairs, the obligation is not satisfied by merely tendering payment, as a buy who tenders payment in the form of a rubber check or counterfeit currency has not satisfied his obligation. In most instances, the payment is accepted and validated in a short amount of time, and the buyer's obligation is fulfilled.

The obligation of the seller, meanwhile, has greater longevity. In most instances, their obligation to the buyer is not fulfilled by delivering a physical good or performing a service, but persists for a reasonable amount of time afterward. Primarily, if the seller has misrepresented the nature of the good itself, this is fundamentally no different than a buyer who has presented counterfeit currency.

Beyond that, the seller remains obligated until the item has been consumed or a reasonable amount of time has passed, such that age or usage could reasonably be expected to devalue the item for its intended purpose. The qualification of "reasonable" indicates that there is some variance that I will not presently explore. There is also the notion that the seller must share responsibility for any harm that arises from the use of an item that he has provided to a buyer, but this is a separate matter from the sales transaction.

And so, in the context of a single transaction the obligations between buyer seller are limited in their duration. In a basic sense, the buyer's obligation terminates on receipt of payment, and the sellers obligation terminates on the consumption of the goods provided.

An ongoing relationship between buyer and seller can be seen in a basic sense as a chain of transactions, with the obligation of seller to buyer renewing on each purchase (though to be precise, each obligation is entirely separate, so it is not a renewal of the same obligation but the initiation of a separate obligation, similar to the previous one).

It is in this sense that obligations take on persistence: it is understood that the buyer will be inclined (of importance - "inclined" and not "required") to return to the same seller, and that the seller will be inclined to serve the same buyer, so long as each fulfills their obligations in the previous transaction. And given the experience of successful transactions, a level of trust will arise for mutual obligations to be fulfilled. And until such time as the trust remains, the relationship persists.

My sense is I've digressed to a separate topic (relationships) which merits further consideration on its own - but in the context of the duration of obligation, it's significant to note that an "ongoing" obligation arises through repeat transactions - it is not separate and independent of the individual transactions.

Source of Obligation

In the context of a transaction, two parties consent to take separate actions, each for the benefit of the other, and the expectation of gaining the benefit from the action of the other party becomes a motivation to perform the action that is expected of them by the other party. In this way, the actions are no longer independent of one another: one party would not be motivated to act for the benefit of the other were it not for the benefit they expected to receive in return.

One problem of this approach is in the focus on expectation. An individual is not obligated to undertake an action simply because it is expected by another – the obligation arises from a promise: an indication of intention that is presented to the other, with the intention that they would accept it as true and govern their own actions accordingly.

When conflict arises in the context of obligation, the blame is assigned to one of two parties. If the individual who presented the promise fails to act according to the terms of the promise, they are clearly in the wrong. If the individual who accepted the promise made assumptions about the terms of the promise (up to and including the notion that a promise had been communicated), the other party is not held accountable. Much argument arises from the conflict over what each party understood to be promised, and it merits consideration at a later time.

It’s also worth noting that there may be obligation that exists outside the context of a transaction: when one party indicates to another an intent to undertake an action without the necessity of the other party performing them any service in return, this is deemed to be a unilateral promise.

A unilateral promise is not enforceable as a contract. Because the actor received no obligation in return, the second party is not entitled to compensation for the failure of the actor to perform the action. However, if the second party undertook an action based on a unilateral promise, and suffered damage as a result, it can reasonably be argued that the action of the first party, in making the promise, caused harm to the second party, whose actions were based on expectations created by the first. This seems in the nature of deception or dishonestly rather than neglect of an obligation.

Considering the consequences of both bilateral and unilateral obligations, the common element seems to be an indication on the part of one party that is taken as earnest by the second, such that the future action of the second party is dependent on their expectation that the first party will act on the intentions they have communicated.

This seems to be around about way of suggesting that obligations arise from promises, regardless of whether any promise is made in return, and that the source of harm inherent in neglecting obligation arises from the actions that others may take on the belief that a promise is made in earnest.

Harm to Opportunity

There is a notion that it is possibly to do harm to others by undertaking actions that obstruct their opportunity to act – that is, because you have done something, another person no longer has the opportunity to act in a way that he intended: your action has prevented his action. While this seems plausible, it is extremely tenuous.

It is reasonable to conclude that one action may prevent another, whether by means of physical obstruction or by altering the environment in a way that the prerequisites of the second action are no longer possible. For a solitary individual in an environment devoid of others, it is an objective fact that the choice to perform one action prevents the performance of others, even if the only prerequisite is the time required to perform the task. In a social setting, it becomes more problematic.

My sense is that the notion of property settles most of the disputes about obstruction of opportunity. One cannot rightly claim that another person has obstructed his action if he had not the material prerequisites to undertake that action. That is to say, the person must own the property necessary to the action, or have the permission of the owner to use it.

In the latter instance, where the owner of property has granted permission to multiple parties for the use of property (such as “public” property that the state proposes to be available to all citizens), such conflicts can arise, and it is generally accepted that the owner is responsible for resolving these conflicts by being more specific in the conditions of the permission granted other parties. In the context of politics, this is the basis of a considerable amount of law.

With this in mind, I am unable to conceive of an instance in which the notion of doing harm by obstructing another party could be said to exist where no property is involved. And so, if one considers harm to opportunity, it is most often a consequence of harm to property – though the logic seems to become circular when harm to property is grounded in the harm to opportunity. As such, I can conclude that the two are related, but the cause-and-effect nature of this relationship remains a bit muddled (specifically, in terms of which derives from the other).

Harm to Property

The notion of “property” entails the authority to use physical objects. Items are understood to belong to an “owner,” whether an individual or a group of individuals, who have control over their property and are entitled to use it. A person does not have an entitlement to the property of anyone else, except by permission of the owner.

This notion is much debated in politics, and while that is beyond the scope of this study, it stands to note that political systems also ascribe to the notion of property, whether it is the use of property by a governmental organization, or when the ownership is implicit in that the privilege of any citizen or class to use the property by permission of government. While I’d prefer to avoid digressing, I expect there will invariably arise an instance in which property is controlled by government, or in which the property of an individual is usurped by government (e.g., taxation), and will consider it further in that context.

For the present, my sense is that it can be taken as premise that an individual or organization claims certain items as “owned” and maintains the right to use them or grant permission for others to use them, and other parties are expected to acknowledge their ownership and refrain from doing harm to the property of others without explicit permission.

It’s also worth nothing that property is central to the notion of business, as the chief activities of business pertain not to action, but to property: obtaining property, using it, providing it to others) in exchange for other property), so I expect it is a topic of constant concern.

In the present context of doing harm, harm to property is derive from harm to person. To damage or destroy property is to diminish or eliminate the owner’s ability to act in the interests of serving their needs to which that property is requisite. For example, to destroy or taint food is to interfere with the owner’s ability to eat, which is in turn to do physical damage to the owner of property.

Neglect versus Harm

In considering of the notion of "doing harm" to others, harm was considered only as a consequences of action. I have considered the possibility that harm could also be considered to arise from a person's neglect to act - and am led to the conclusion that this is not the equivalent of doing harm.

Primarily, an action is considered to be ethical or unethical by virtue of its consequences. When a person has not taken an action, no consequences have been effected, and there is no basis for the ethical evaluation of something that has no been done. Even so, there remains the argument that harm has been done by an individual's neglect.

This does not stand to reason: in a situation where an individual has neglected to undertake an action for the benefit of another party, harm is not caused. The other party was already in a situation where harm would come to them, and the neglect of another party to render assistance is not the cause of that harm, nor does their choice not to render assistance, in itself, cause the harm to be increased - the harm would befall the other party if the actor were entirely absent from the situation, and his mere presence does not obligate him to act.

This is not to say that neglect is acceptable in all situations: specifically, in the instance where there is a relationship between to individuals, it is generally (though not universally) understood that one of the conditions of a relationship is mutual assistance in time of need.

While this seems a reasonable conclusion, it rests upon a few notions that have not been explored as yet: the notion of a relationship (which has been considered previously 10/5 but in a superficial manner) and the notion that conditions of a relationship may be implicit.

The concept that a relationship exists between any two parties due to proximity is largely a concern of politics - which implies that otherwise unacquainted persons have an implicit relationship with one another as members of a of a given society or community (which are also abstract notions) - and that any member of a society is obligated, under certain circumstances, to provide assistance to other members of the society. But again, political arguments are beyond the scope of the topic of this blog.

While I cannot concede the obligation of one person to render aid to another, I can conceive that a party may feel entitled to grant assistance to others, and that this may in certain situations be entirely ethical. Provided he has sufficient understanding of the situation to be reasonably certain that the other party will come to harm, the decision to render aid is rational. And provided his actions do no harm, the action may be considered to be ethical.

However, this is a digression to another topic - whether it is ethical to undertake action for the benefit of others, which has previously been considered. The present question is whether it neglecting to act for the benefit of others can be considered the equivalent of doing harm - and I am reasonably confident in the conclusion that it cannot.

Doing Harm to Others

It has been concluded that an obligation that arises by virtue of the social environment is the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that do harm to others. The notion is that this is an obligation merits further consideration - but for the present, my intention is to focus on the concept of "doing harm."

The most plausible rationale for concluding that an action has done harm is in that it has ended the life of another person, as life has been defined as the primary value, from which all other values derive. This would seem to be axiomatic.

It would follow, then, that one could also conclude that harm has been done by any action that is derived from this fundamental value. To return to the hierarchy of needs, any action that places a person in immediate peril by preventing their ability to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, etc. can be concluded to do harm to that individual.

There is also some merit to the notion of there being degrees of harm: to injure a person is to do less harm than to injure him, to steal water that he is in immediate need of is to do less harm than to steal water he has secured to meet his future needs, to cause a neighbor to mistrust him is to do less harm than to subvert the trust of his spouse.

By strict and binary logic, to do harm at all is unethical, but the consideration of the degree of harm that has been done may be significant in some decisions. In particular, when an action would benefit one party and harm another, it may be reasoned that the benefit is "worth" the harm. I do not have the sense that the action can be considered ethical, since harm is done - but it stands to reason that certain decisions may involve choosing the least unethical course of action.

This brings to mind the assertion that it is impossible, under any circumstances, to take any action without causing harm to someone. I'm inclined to disagree - primarily because the notion is generally backed either by hypothetical situation involving conditions that are highly improbable, or contortions of logic that stretch and distort the concept of harm, or both.

The notion of harm becomes weaker at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It seems less plausible to assert that one has "done harm" if an action causes a person to feel less self-esteem or obstructs an individual from becoming more "self-actualized." It seems to me that the attempt to place upon another person an obligation for preserving one's own sense of self-worth is a manipulative tactic, common to the passive-aggressive personality type. While there may be some merit to this notion, I am unable to presently conceive of an example of a situation in which it would apply.

I don't consider this topic to be "closed" - there are a few other considerations that come to mind, and I am not confident that this logic is complete or entirely accurate, though I expect that this will suffice for most purposes.

Nature of Obligation

My aim is to consider the circumstances in which the standards of ethics may conclude that an individual is obligated to act for the benefit of another party. This tends to be a difficult subject, and the focal point of much consideration and argument, and a fundamental consideration to ethics.

To begin, obligation is the focal point of ethics. When a person acts alone, undertaking an action that has no appreciable impact on other parties, the question of ethics do not arise. A person is expected to act in ways beneficial to himself as a matter of course. A person is entitled to act in ways that are harmful to himself, though this may seem irrational to an observer. The consideration of "right" and "wrong" are practical matters, nothing more.

The consideration of ethics begins only when a second party enters the stage, and the consequences of the actions undertaken by an actor impact this second person. They may have a direct impact, in which any harm or benefit immediately arises from the action, or an indirect impact, in that the consequences of the action alter the situation in a way that is ultimately beneficial or harmful to the other party by virtue of the change in the environment.

The fundamental question of ethics, then, is whether it is "right" for a person to take an action due to the consequences it may have for other parties. This gives rise to the notion that the individual is required to consider the impact to other parties before undertaking any course of action.

And at this, a working definition of obligation can be derived: obligation is the requirement for an individual to consider the consequences of an action to other parties in advance of undertaking that action.

While this may be tedious, my sense is that it might give rise to problems if the goal of obligation were not fully explored: given that the options are to act or refrain from acting, and given that the consequences may be beneficial or harmful, there are four possible outcomes (1):

Obligation to act in ways that are harmful to others

The notion that a person is obliged to harm others seems entirely absurd at first, and on further consideration it remains largely so. The only exception I can presently conceive is in reaction. It might be argued that acting in a way to harm another person effects restitution (when the actor seeks to be compensated for the harm done by the previous actions of another person) and a punitive value (when the harm inflicted on another is a punishment that is intended to dissuade them from repeating the action that elicited the reactive punishment).

Punitive action is a topic best suited for political and legal debate, so I expect to avoid it in future. While the notion of restitution seems germane to the topic of business, in that an individual who has performed a service and not received payment may feel obligated to obtain compensation in a manner that could be perceived as harmful to the other party, the primary interest in doing so is not to harm the other party, but to gain the benefit to which they feel entitled. This may bear further consideration in that context, but not in the sense of obligation.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are helpful to others

This notion seems unusual, though not quite as absurd as the former, in that the typical argument is based on the premise that when it is possible to help others, the obligation is to render aid rather than withhold it (which will be addressed later). Even so, my sense is that there are instances in which a person may be obligated to refrain from acting in a way that benefits other parties.

One instance in which it is logical to feel reluctance to render assistance is in the context of education or mentoring. The belief that another person will not learn a skill or be inclined to develop the facility for performing a task if another party intercedes to perform tasks in his benefit does seem to be rational. In this sense, the actor's intention in refraining from assisting is positive in its intent: to give to the other person not the immediate benefit they may wish to have, but instead a more long-term benefit of learning to accomplish the task for themselves.

Another instances in which it is logical to refrain from rendering assistance is in a situation where the actor accepts the limitation of his own knowledge. That is to say, the actor is uncertain whether the action he undertakes will render a benefit the other party desires without doing greater harm. In plainer terms, there is the obligation not to interfere in situations where you lack the information, experience, and knowledge to be sufficiently certain that the action will have a beneficial outcome.

Obligation to act in ways that are helpful to others

Under certain circumstances, the notion that a person may be obligated to undertake an action for the benefit of another party seems reasonable. However, the precise circumstances are a subject of much debate, and bear far more scrutiny that I can give them in the content of the present post.

I expect there will be many meditations in which the notion of this obligation is considered, and I can think of no general principle that I can state at the present time, without more intense consideration.

Obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others

It seems to me that the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that are harmful to others is virtually an axiom. "Doing no harm" seems a requirement for considering an action to be wholly ethical. An individual is entitled act in a way that harms himself if he so desires, and obligated to suffer the negative consequences of his own actions is a matter of course, but I can find no rational basis the notion that an individual is obligated to harm others.

Exceptions to this principle seem absurd: the notion that a party would seek to obligate another to undertake an action in which the sole consequences would be to harm them would be the equivalent of acting, by proxy, to harm themselves - which would fall into the defined categories as altruistic, sacrificial, or insane.

Notes

1. I have conveniently omitted from the consideration above instances in which an action has no consequences for others, or instances in which the consequences do not result in appreciable harm or benefit to others. I don't wish to take these off the table, as a number of false dilemmas arise from the exclusion of the possibility of actions that have no appreciable consequence. However, I believe they can rightly be excluded from consideration in the context of obligation.

Categorization of Consequences

In considering the consequences of an action to self versus to others, there seem to be nine possible outcomes when comparing the consequences to self to the consequences to others, which can be schematized thus:

	Benefit Others	No Consequence	Harm Others
Benefit Self	Benevolent	Self-Interested	Questionable
No Consequence	Charitable	Inconsequential	Sociopathic
Harm Self	Altruistic	Sacrificial	Irrational

As a note, I'm not sure if the labels I've given to these categories are entirely accurate, but found that attempting to use some neutral indicator was either verbose ("actions that benefit the self while having no consequence to others") or incomprehensible ("Type BN" or "Type 2"). This may bear further consideration - but for the present, the intention is to consider the interplay of the outcomes.

And while it's been noted before, it bears repeating that "no consequence" is shorthand for "no significant consequence," in that all actions have some consequence, but the consequence has no significance under most circumstances.

I've considered the merits of considering each of these nine categories, in and of themselves, but have decided not to do so at the present time. It seems a bit overly oriented with details that may be inconsequential. I may change my mind about that later, but for now:

Actions that have no consequences for any party, called "inconsequential" in the table above, do not merit further inquiry. An action that has no consequence cannot be assessed as good or bad, but might reasonably be called a waste of time and resources. Perhaps the only interest to ethics is the choice of an inconsequential action over a beneficial alternative, but even that seems of little interest

Actions that have a benefit to one or both parties (benevolent, charitable, or self-interested) but cause no harm to anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "good" without the need to meditate upon it further.

Actions that harm one or both parties (sacrificial, sociopathic, or irrational) but precipitate no benefit for anyone are likewise of little interest to ethics: one can conclude that the action is "bad" without the need to meditate upon it further.

The altruistic action, which harms self and benefits others, merits some consideration. However, even this is of limited interest to ethics, as the decision is entered into freely by the actor, who is just as entitled to act to his own detriment as he is to act in his own benefit. In situations where a third party attempts to manipulate or deceive an individual into harming himself for their benefit, ethics is applied to the action of manipulation or deceit separate from the altruistic action.

The category of greatest interest to ethics are those actions deemed questionable - where an actor seeks to benefit himself and accepts that there are negative consequences to others. The degree to which this is acceptable or unacceptable to ethics is largely a matter of degree. By the strictest application of ethics, a person is required to do no harm to others, even if this means foregoing any benefit he might gain by doing so. By a more liberal interpretation, a person may be forgiven for the harm to others if the harm done is of lesser degree than the benefit - but even in that interpretation, it is conceded that the action is essentially unethical.

Prioritizing the Benefit to Others

When an individual acts in self-interests, the prioritization of his interests is weighted according to the immediacy of benefit to self. When an individual acts in the interest of other parties, there are two considerations to be made: the level of benefit to a given party and the choice of one party's benefits over another's.

The first consideration, the choice among benefits to a single party, would seem to be easily resolved, as the same method of prioritization can be applied: if your intention is to benefit a starving man, his needs are best addressed by a meal. Giving him "job training" to improve his lot may be argued to have a greater long-term impact on alleviating his condition, by better equipping him to serve his future needs (second-level security need) but his immediate condition (first-level survival need) is of greater importance.

The second consideration, determining which of multiple others is to be served, seems more arbitrary: the need of a person five feet away is no greater or less than that of a person five thousand miles away. The choice to help the closer party is often a practical matter: it is easier. And while the easy choice is not necessarily the most ethical, it is often the most efficient. To provide assistance to a party at a distance requires transportation (the cost of which may make the donation impracticable), transportation will take time (by the time help arrives, it may no longer be needed), etc. The impact upon ethics is in the effect of distance upon the conditions and probable consequences of the decision.

When it is just as practical to serve the needs of one party as the needs of another, it becomes a question of the actor's own values. In particular, the benefit to others may be regarded as a third-level of fourth-level benefit to self.

The third-level benefit to self is service to social needs, and it seems rational that the greater the service to self, the more one is vested in the interests of the other party. Hence, a person is more likely to act in the interests of a member of their immediate family than a stranger, a member of their community rather than an outsider, a member of their own country than an immigrant. This is not merely an emotional decision, but a rational one, in that the benefit is to bestowed upon a "closer" party because the actor has greater personal interest in their welfare, in that the relationship with that person has greater potential future value to self.

The fourth-level benefit to self is an interest in gaining esteem, which is very often the unspoken motive behind charitable or altruistic actions. A person provides benefits to others so that other individuals (including, but not limited to, the individual to whom they granted the benefit) will be more inclined to regard them as a noble person and worthy of their deference. This is evident in the desire to be charitable in a conspicuous way - not merely to perform an act of charity, but to make it known to others that they have acted charitably, and therefore to grant them the esteem that was the self-serving motive of being charitable.

The exception would seem to be an anonymous donation that benefits others, but my sense is this is still related to gaining esteem - only in this instance, it is self-esteem. It is not important to others to recognize the charitable action, but the individual experiences positive feelings about themselves for having undertaken a charitable action. In the absence of any other benefit to self, charitable action is valued because it "feels good" to be charitable, regardless of whether the action actually benefited anyone else. This phenomenon explains why so many people donate to charity without checking to see that the funds they donate are being used for the purpose for which they were provided - they have reaped the reward of self-esteem, which was their prime motivation.

In acting for the benefits of others, an person who is rational and ethical will evaluate these various factors to come to a decision about which action to undertake, though my sense is there is quite a bit of interplay among the various factors. For example, if it is a choice between granting a benefit to a party that in a manner that would grant the actor greater esteem and a more distant one to who is in greater need, the consideration of the various factors may not be logically or mathematically precise.

Motivation to Act for the Benefit of Others

Given that action is motivated by the desire to effect a benefit and that it can be taken for granted that an individual will act in self-interest, there remains the potential for an individual to act to effect a benefit for others.

There seems to be an imperative in Western culture to act for the benefits of others. This quality is evident much of historical philosophy and the contemporary philosophy that derives from historical bases. Much of which seeks to define ethics in a societal rather than a social context - the difference being that a "societal" approach to ethics considers the individual as having less value than the group and must therefore self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, whereas the "social" approach to ethics acknowledges that an individual is entitled to act for his own benefit but consider any negative impact to others as undesirable consequence.

Likewise, there is a notion that a truly altruistic person disregards their own needs and safety in order that their actions might benefit other parties - often vaguely defined as a "society" to which he is subordinate. This strikes me as a hollow notion, and one most often used in an unethical manner: to subordinate others to the service of an imaginary group (mainly, the church or the state) in order to skew their logic to serve the purpose of the individual to serving the interests of whomever is seeking to motivate/manipulate them.

Proponents of societal ethics tend to represent social ethics as being opposed to society - that acting in self-interest is done with disregard for the welfare of others - and therefore an individual who does not subordinate themselves to service of the society is anti-social, perhaps even to the degree of being sociopathic or seeking primarily to harm others. This is propaganda.

The social approach to ethics accepts that individuals will act in their own interests, but includes the benefit of others as a benefit to self, and proposes an ethic of action that does not necessarily exclude service to others or disregard their welfare. Considering that the motivation of the individual stems from the needs of the individual, any "other" party may be considered as a third- or fourth- level need of the self.

Returning to Maslow, the higher-level needs that an individual is motivated to serve derive from their interaction and relationship with other individuals.

A third-level need, called a "social" need recognizes that man is a social creature, and is motivated to pursue mutually-beneficial relationships with other individuals (who are expected to be motivated by the mutually-beneficial nature of the relationship). The mutually-beneficial nature of the relationship is key to the motivation of the individual: if there is a social connection from which the individual receives no benefit, there is no motivation to establish and preserve that relationship.

The fourth-level need, called an "esteem" need, is also evident in a social context: the desire to gain esteem exists only within a social context. This is achieved only though service to others, as "esteem" is granted to members of a group who are seen to be of greatest service to the group. There is therefore a motivation for an individual to act in ways that achieve benefits to others.

The fifth-level needs tend to be vaguely defined, but they also strike me as being social in nature: a person is "actualized" in their growth within a society and the positive impact they have upon it. In a loose sense, it can be said that a person is motivated to reap the psychological rewards of acting to achieve a "better world" in a sense that is related to long-term benefits and large-scale impact.

The main difference between societal ethics and social ethics is that, in societal ethics, Maslow's hierarchy is inverted (or perhaps subverted) to suggest that the individual must first seek to achieve a "better world" before concerning himself with his basic (survival) needs, whereas in social ethics, the good of society is a recognized as a need, but is prioritized at the proper level of interest: an individual is motivated to act in the interest of his own survival before acting to achieve the higher-level goals, which is in line with Maslow's theory.

Entitlement of the Actor

Having considered the potential positive and negative consequences of an action to the actor himself, it has been concluded that an action that has no consequences for any other party is not within the scope of ethics to evaluate.

There is, however, a precipitating (or perhaps underlying) premise: that an individual is entitled to undertake action in his own welfare, which include undertaking actions that may ultimately be detrimental to his own welfare.

Objectively, it may seem that there are situations in which another party may wish to intervene in order to prevent an individual from undertaking action that poses a threat to his own welfare, or even to compel an individual to undertake an action that would improve his own welfare, but intervention is ethically questionable, as any party other than the actor does not have sufficient knowledge of the intentions of the actor and is likely to be mistaken about whether the action in question is intended to be beneficial or harmful to the actor.

In situations where another party's own welfare is at stake, the desire to restrict the actions of others can be based in a desire to defend against a threat to their own welfare. As such, the act of intervention is pursuit of personal interest, in which instance the person who means to intervene must consider the ethics of their own (intervening) action.

In situations where this other party's interests are not at stake, there is no justification for intervening. There remains an emotional motivation to act, the notion that another party will feel a sense of regret at their failure to have intervened, but emotion is no basis for logic (though again, it may in some instances be a cue that the logic bears greater scrutiny), nor are the consequences of not acting to be equivocated with the consequences of undertaking to act.

Actions that Harm the Actor

In the previous post, actions that have consequences only to the actor were considered to be ethically neutral. However, this was considered only in the positive perspective: actions that have benefits to the actor. It may be interesting to consider this in a negative perspective as well: if an individual undertakes an action that harms only himself, is this ethical?

This is not an expected behavior: that a person might act in order to do harm to himself seems absurd and irrational, and is one of the key criteria by which a person is to be declared insane by the standards of psychology. At yet, it is within the realm of possibility.

Strictly speaking, if the harm a person does to himself is of no consequence to any other party, this action remains beyond the scope of ethics. However, returning to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, our social connections to others may be perceived as a third-level need of our own. Therefore, by harming himself, the individual may also be creating a consequence to other parties, and the action is no longer beyond the scope of ethics: a person who harms oneself is to do harm to those who are dependent on their social connection to that person.

It that sense, the action of doing harm to self has a consequence of doing harm to others. If no benefit is to be achieved by harming oneself, then the action is entirely negative, hence unethical.

One question that precipitates is: whether others are obliged or even entitled to intervene in a situation where a person seems to be acting in a way that is harmful to himself. The difficulty in accepting this obligation as a necessity is that the perception may be incorrect.

There are situations in which a person may seem to be acting in a way that is harmful to self to an observer who is unaware of the actor’s intentions. For example, if an individual is seen to be throwing away food – tossing grain into the dirt – it is likely his intention is not what is immediately apparent (to waste food that is essential to his first-level survival needs), but to achieve a different objection (to sow seeds as a means to grow food for his future survival needs). In that way, intervention is a presumption on the part of one person that they know the full intent of another individuals actions.

When there is a social connection between individuals, the motivation of another person to intervene for the welfare of another person seems reasonable, though there remains an obligation to be diligent in ensuring that the intent of the action is understood. But even then, there remains the liklihood that the person who seeks to intervene is putting their own interests before those of the other party.

When there is no social connection between the individuals, the motivation of the other person to intervene is less defensible. Even when it is well-intentioned, it is an interference in the lives of others without any rational justification for doing so. To suggest that a person is entitled to interfere with the lives of others with whom they have no connection may be arguable, but this strikes me as a matter of politics.

Another question that precipitates is: whether an individual is obliged to undertake action that is detrimental to themselves for the benefit of other parties. That is to say, when the welfare of one party is considered to be more important than that of another, and the latter is ethically required to self-sacrifice for the welfare of those who are better or more deserving than himself.

At face value, this is an deplorable notion, that is often at the basis of exploitation: the slave, being less important than the master, is to be held to self-sacrifice for the welfare of his master. But at the same time, it is said to be honorable of an individual to self-sacrifice for the welfare of others. I strongly suspect that this is the machination of those who wish to create a situation in which others are expected to sacrifice for their welfare, and to promulgate such an action as noble or honorable is propaganda. However, I’ll avoid accepting that as a firm conclusion until such time as I have put further consideration into the conflict of interests between multiple parties.

For the present, I believe that I can rest in the conclusion that an action that causes harm only to the actor is beyond the scope of ethics, that the obligation or entitlement to intervene is a separate matter, and the obligation to self-sacrifice another still.

Ethics in Social Context

Another extrapolation from Maslow is that action is motivated by the needs or interests of the actor, and that ethics is considered in terms of the impact of that action in terms of its consequence to other parties. In other words, ethics is not primarily concerned with the self-interest of the actor.

It is expected that a person will act in pursuit of their own values, and in instances where there is no consequence to any other party, ethics does not apply. When a person is motivated by their own hunger to eat, the act of eating is not of any ethical significance whatsoever – it is merely the satisfaction of his own needs, of consequence to no other party.

That is not to say that any benefit to self is to be excluded or discounted from consideration. The fact that the act of eating renders a benefit to the actor remains as a motivation to act. The decision is still rational, and it is practical, but the lack of benefit or detriment to another party makes it of negligible interest to ethics.

Ethics is concerned with the social context of action – the consequences of an action to other parties. I cannot go so far as to say “to society,” as “society” lacks definition and includes parties for whom an action has no consequences. And again, if there are no consequences, there is nothing for ethics to consider in determining the nature of the action in terms of good or evil.

It’s also noted that needs are taken for granted, and a motivation to fill a need is presumed. This is the rationale for action, which is of key interest to ethics. It seems pointless to apply reason to evaluate an action that is not the result of a reasoned decision, though ethics may castigate the neglect of considering consequences before undertaking action.

It is also presumed that some action will be taken to address a need. A person who is hungry will seek to satisfy that need by eating, a prerequisite of which is obtaining food. In such an instance, ethics is not primarily concerned with the satisfaction of the need for the actor (to eat being neutral), but with the actions undertaken in obtaining food, insofar as they affect other parties.

That is to say that the person will eat, as a practical matter, and the function of ethics is to help him to identify the course of action, among the various possibilities, by which he will satisfy this requirement. It is the means, rather than the action, that are evaluated with the intention of making a rational decision, given that the individual is motivated to undertake some form of action to fill that need.

And to return to the original point, that if the action an individual undertakes to fill a need has no impact on any other party, his actions are of no interest to ethics.

Ethics and Values

I have accepted as a premise that the function of ethics is to guide action in consideration of the consequences: that an action that precipitates a positive consequence is good, and an action that achieves a negative consequence is bad, and that the evaluation of the ethics of the decision to act relies upon the whole of the consequences of that action. But this remains vague: the definition "good" and "bad" are unclear.

My sense is that "good" is related to the achievement of a value or a goal - and will for the present consider the two to be analogous, as goals precipitate from values. That an action achieves a goal is merely a question of practicality or efficiency, and as such the value from which that goal is derived is of the greater significance.

Returning to Maslow, the value of primary concern is life. Any action that preserves life is of the highest interest to an individual, and the more immediate the impact, the higher the priority of the interest. Upon further reflection it seemed that this could also be of service to ethics, as existence itself would precede the accomplishment of any other end.

When ethics is considered in the context of religion, the value of human life is subordinate to spiritual matters. This is still a consideration of man's existence, though in the non-corporeal form of a spirit or a soul. And in that context, the harm done to a person in their corporeal life is justified by the benefit that an action might have to the condition of their non-corporeal form.

I do not care to pursue that line of thought further, as it is not germane to the ethics of business, whose sole concern is the present reality rather than the notion of a non-corporeal existence, though it bears mentioning as a matter of differentiating the ethics of business from the ethics of religion, as well as the ethical considerations that an individual may choose to make for religious reasons.

And while it is my intention to hold "life" as the root of value, with all other values being derived from it, it's also worth mentioning that existence is not universally or eternally compelling. There may be instances in which the conditions of existence cause an individual to devalue existence and, specifically, to pursue its opposite.

The most common incidence of this inversion is considered in the context of health and wellness. Faced with a physical condition in which "to live" means an existence of torment and despair, it seems plausible that one may come to the conclusion that life holds no value and, instead, seek to put an end to one's own existence.

It is not my intent to explore that topic at this time. It may have special interest to the healthcare industry, but under normal circumstances, most decisions are made in a context where life is the primary value, and instances in which it is desirable to end one's existence constitute an unusual and exceptional set of circumstances that cannot provide guidance for decision-making outside of those situations.

Prioritization of Interests

Consideration of the hierarchy of needs as a basis for the prioritization of interests would suggest that the most ethical decision is driven by the utility to the lowest level of need. But I have a sense it’s not quite so simple.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences only to himself, it is plausible to consider that the definite sacrifice of a higher priority in order to definitely achieve a lower priority is irrational. (To be considered separately: do ethics even apply in such a situation?) However, in advance of an action being undertaken, the outcomes are not definite, and the decision-maker must consider probability.

In that sense, an individual may perceive that the chances of success at serving the lower priority are such that it is worth the risk to the higher priority. For example, entry into many social groups (a third-level priority) require an individual to undergo an initiation that poses an immediate threat to their well-being (a first-level priority). In is not unusual, nor necessarily irrational, for an individual to accept that risk.

The risk involved in investing is of a similar nature: while both the amount risked and the amount gained are a second-level priority (wealth, as a means to satisfy future needs), an individual may assess that the benefit of increasing their wealth is worth the risk of the amount they risk in the investment.

When an individual makes a decision that has consequences to himself and another person, interests are viewed from the perspective of the decision maker. That is to say that a first-level priority of one party (their immediate need) is at best a third-level priority when the consequences to them is made by someone else (presuming they value their social connection to another party).

The ethics of survival puzzles generally play upon this principle: a person who has the authority an ability to decide on a disposition of a resource that is immediately needed for himself and another party, it is presumed that the inclination of the decision-maker is to serve his self-interest first. From a purely functional or purely psychological perspective, this may be entirely justified, but it is not necessarily acceptable from an ethical perspective.

When an individual makes a decision that has no consequences to himself, and the benefit or harm is only to other parties, similar factors are taken into consideration. When the benefit and harm are to be done to a single party, the decision-maker is to consider the value of each and the risks to be considered (in effect, to make as “good” a decision for the other party as he would for himself).

When the benefit is granted to one party at the expense of another, the decision-maker who is motivated entirely by self-interest can be expected to consider the value of each party to himself, and comes to a decision based on the value he places on his future relationship with each of the two parties. However, if the decision-maker has no existing relationship and expects to have no future relationship, his decision is arbitrary.

Much of this bears further consideration – but insofar as the prioritization of interests is concerned, it would seem acceptable to accept Maslow’s hierarchy of needs as a basis for rational decision-making when the benefit and harm implicit in a decision pertain to a single party. However, it is not a complete answer to the dilemma faced by a decision-maker who is weighing consequences that benefit one party and harm another.

Maslow Reconsidered

The primary problem in applying Maslow's hierarchy to ethics is that Maslow explores the motivations of the individual to act in his own benefit, whereas ethics most often considers the effect of actions upon others.

That said, there are a few aspects of Maslow's theory that seem compelling:

Primarily, that interests can be prioritized by a hierarchy, some being more important than others. This seems entirely rational, and has value to ethics in overcoming some to the problems inherent in binary systems of ethics - in which a consequence is labeled as good or bad without a sense of the degree of importance or impact.

Second, that the importance of an interest is relative to the achievement of a core value. In Maslow's hierarchy, it is clear that the chief "need" toward which an individual is motivated is life itself - in the sense of the survival of the individual. I have a sense that the same can be said of ethics - not only in the role that values play, but also in the identification of life itself as the root value, from which all other values are derived.

Third, and this is admittedly an indirect extrapolation, that the motivation of an individual to serve his own interests is entirely a matter of psychology that has little importance or interest to ethics. Said another way, ethics takes it for granted that an individual will act in his own interests, to serve his own needs, and that this is of no consequence to ethics. Instead, ethics focuses on the consequences of an action to others, and one of the chief ethical dilemmas is in considering when the harm done to others is justified by the benefit to self.

Each of these three aspects merit further consideration.

Maslow's Hierarchy

I've been stewing over the previous post and have found it difficult to proceed further along the topic without more detailed consideration of needs, desires, and interests. Unable to define them from a purely philosophical perspective, I defer to psychology.

It merits mention that philosophy and psychology are closely inter-related, such that one often intrudes on the other, and generally, the consequences are less than optimal (a psychologist's take on philosophy, and vice-versa, tend to be sloppy and inaccurate), and so it's important to state that my intent here is not to redefine psychology, but borrow upon it until a purely philosophical answer can be found.

Even so, it cannot be borrowed without some modification. Primarily, Maslow's theory is considered to be a hierarchy of needs, and I find that the distinction of "need" from "desire" is hazy at best, and moreover, it is of no consequence to ethics. And so, my intent is to translate Maslow's hierarchy of needs into a hierarchy of interests, and set aside the classification of an interest as a need or a desire.

Maslow's theory was that there are a broad array of human needs that can be depicted as a hierarchy, such that the lowest level of need is of primary interest to the individual, and that it is generally the case that the individual will be inclined to fill his lowest level of need before seeking to fulfill needs on a higher level.

This would translate to the subject of ethics as the motivation to serve an interest (or "satisfy a need"), and to prioritize certain interests over others (addressing basic needs before seeking to fulfill higher ones).

The lowest level of the hierarchy, hence the highest level of priority to motivation, are "physiological" needs, which arise from the immediate necessity of sustaining life: the need to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, and react to medical emergencies that pose immediate threat to life and well-being. The needs at this level can be further prioritized by their immediacy: the need to breathe being more pressing than the need to eat.

At the next level are the needs that Maslow considered to be essential to safety and security. These are still based on physiological needs, but seek to fulfill future needs rather than immediate ones: the need to avoid injury or treat medical conditions that are not an immediate threat, the need to establish stores of food and water for future consumption, etc.

The next level are social needs, which are also derived from physiological needs, but in the context of other people. Specifically, the individual is motivated to enter into relationships with others that will help him to fulfill his future needs more efficiently: family, neighbors, community, employer, etc. It is at this level that the motivation begins to become blurred, as psychology insists that an individual has a "need" to belong to social units that is not directly related to his ability to fulfill his physiological needs.

The next level of needs pertain to esteem, which is a purely psychological consideration. This deals with the emotional fulfillment of the individual: self-esteem, the respect of others, confidence in his abilities, and a sense of achievement.

The highest level of needs pertain to self-actualization: the development of abilities that did not previously exist, and are not directly related to physiological needs. Though it seems to me that this is related to esteem (a person gains abilities to increase the same factors, respect, confidence, sense of achievement), I may be overlooking the reason for differentiating them.

From a perspective of ethics, the first three levels of Maslow's hierarchy are acceptable in their objectivity. I do not think it could be argued that these "needs" represent genuine and objectively valid motivations.

However, the purely psychological elements of the highest two levels (and the psychological rather than physiological element of the third) are more difficult to accept as a basis for objective evaluation. I don't dispute that humans are motivated by such things, but find it difficult to include them in objective assessment of interests as they are tautologies (a person desires to belong to a group simply because they desire to belong to a group).

Borrowing upon Maslow's hierarchy, I will accept for the time being that there are four "levels" of interest, in order of highest to lowest priority:

1. Interests that are served in order to satisfy immediate physiological needs
2. Interests that are served in order to directly impact the ability to meet future physiological needs
3. Interests that are served in order to directly impact the ability to meet future physiological needs by means of others
4. Interests that are served for reasons unrelated to physiological needs

I have a sense that this will hold up under a liberal amount of scrutiny, and will suffice for the evaluation of ethics in most situations.

Motivation and Benefit

Previous consideration of action has implied, but may not have directly stated, that actions are undertaken out of a desire to effect a change in conditions. It also seems reasonable to assert that this desire is to effect a change that will result in an improvement of benefit to a certain party.

While this does not discount the possibility that the motivation might be to have a negative or detrimental effect, my sense is that this is seldom (if ever) the motivation of a rational individual - rather, that the negative consequences of an action are side effects rather than the primary motivation.

The benefit to a certain party is also of significance: it is unlikely that there exists an outcome that is universally positive. At best, it will have a positive effect for some, and no appreciable effect upon others. In some instances, generating a positive effect for some may be damaging to others.

This merits consideration, but is beyond the scope of the present consideration: that in assessing ethics, we must account for the complete scope of consequences for all parties that are affected, but the motivation to undertake an action is specific to the interests of a given party.

Germane to the present consideration: what constitutes a benefit? Chiefly benefits are consider in the positive effect on the party under consideration, but a decision may also be motivated by the desire to avoid negative effects. This seems an important distinction, but the effect on motivation are fundamentally the same: whether it is to achieve something "new" or perpetuate the status quo, it is still a benefit.

There also seems to be some distinction between need and desire, though this often falls along the same lines, with a "need" being defined as a motivation to perpetuate the status quo and a "desire" being defined as a motivation to effect a beneficial change to the status quo. Again, there appears to be little difference to motivation.

There also seems to be the sense that a "need" is more pressing than a "desire," and therefore to be automatically granted a higher degree of importance as a motivational factor. My sense is that this is a matter of psychology rather than philosophy - and while it may merit consideration, the two still remain equivalent in the consideration of ethics.

It's also worth noting that benefit and detriment remain subjective concepts - though my sense is that it should be fairly straightforward to classify a specific outcome as good or bad, and that people will generally be in agreement, this remains entirely subjective and shallow in its consideration.

In the end, it seems this meditation has yielded more questions than answers.

Relationships

Another notion that adds complexity to evaluating business transactions is the notion of the "relationship" - specifically, it is possible for a transaction to take place in isolation (a one-time sale to a customer with whom the business will never interact again), but it is more common for transactions to be done in the context of an ongoing relationship (the business sells to the same customers, again and again, over time).

The notion of relationship is important to both parties. It is convenient and efficient, for a customer to be able to obtain the same good from the same vendor, and for a business to sell to repeat customers. However, it is more important from the perspective of a business, as future sales ensure the perpetuation of the organization, which is a tacit goal of most organizations.

I would also posit that it is beneficial to ensuring the consideration of ethics: a business that seeks to make repeated sales, over time, can generally be counted on to treat its customers better than a fly-by-night operation. The latter seeks to have a single interaction, as it has no future interest in the consequences to the customer of the present transaction, whereas the former realizes it must satisfy the customer as a means of obtaining their future business.

One of the weaknesses I have noticed in many studies of this topic is a narrow focus on the immediate transaction, without consideration of the long-term interests of both the customer and the business. The limitation of this consideration is not invalid, and is in fact appropriate for a one-time transaction - but my sense is that this is less common than having an ongoing relationship.

I also have the sense that this is a relatively recent consideration: especially in the field of marketing, the notion of an ongoing relationship seems to be a relatively recent one - or perhaps the popularity of the notion is only increased of late, as it seems to be that many people in business have considered relationships long before it was fashionable to do so. As such, the notion of relationship and its impact on ethics may be a largely unexplored topic.

Transactions

Thus far, the notion of "action" has largely been considered as precipitating from the independent decision of a single party. However, the context of business is a social one, and seldom ever involves a single party's decision to undertake an action without considering the expected actions of others.

A decision is made to sell a good, but this is based on the expectations that others will decide to purchase it. Hence the decision to sell must consider the factors that are taken into account in the decision to purchase, which is made by another party. In this sense, the action of the business is influenced by the perceived future action of the intended customer.

The same can be said of virtually any action undertaken by a business - and "virtually" is a concession to the possibility that there may be some action that is taken independently, though I am presently unable to conceive of such a thing.

The transactional nature of business adds yet another level of complexity to the consideration of ethics in this context: when an item is offered for sale, and it is assessed that the selling of the item is unethical, is the ethical failure to be ascribed to the business that decided to sell the item or the customer who decided to purchase it?

My sense is that this is an important consideration, and is inherent in most real-world situations in which the subject of ethics is raised. However, for the present, I feel it's necessary to separate the two decisions - to treat the decision to sell and the decision to buy as two separate decisions, each of which is made by a different party, each of which must be considered in and of itself.

There are dependencies between them, but it becomes a chicken-and-egg argument: would the customer decide to buy if the item were not for sale, or would the business decided to sell if there were no consumer demand? My sense is that either may be considered true, depending on context.

Tasks in the Context of Action

This post began with another attempt to define the "roles" related to an action, but evolved into defining the tasks that are necessary to perform an action, according to its separate elements (situation, decision, action, and consequences). There may be some misuse of terms remaining in the information that follows.

Situation

When considering a given action, the roles in creating the situation seem to be little importance. To the decision, the situation is accepted as status quo - it exists independent of the decision at hand. However, there may be instances in which the preceding conditions have been created of affected by previous actions.

Even then, the present decision is unable to influence the situation, but the situation has a strong influence of the decision. But an individual who wishes to influence a decision may undertake actions for the sole purpose of influencing the decision.

The ethics of such actions are a separate consideration from the decision - specifically, the decision-maker does not "cause" a person to take action in advance of a decision, but it is rather the choice of the other party to undertake an independent action with a primary intention of affecting the decision to be made.

It can also be said that the application of formal authority is an attempt to modify the situation. The promise of reward or threat of punishment is a pre-existing condition of the decision, which is taken into account in the same manner as any other pre-existing condition. Whether the reward or punishment is actually administered is a consequence, and a separate decision of the influencer ... and for that matter, the decision to communicate a threat or promise is also a separate decision, made by the influencer.

There is also the potential to exert influence over a decision by misleading the decision-maker as to the nature of the situation. The action undertaken to mislead a person is separate from the decision, and the level of confidence a decision-maker places on a false representation (whether he should have trusted the report) merit further consideration, as does the question of whether a person who provides this information can be entirely objective.

Decision

The decision is a critical element in ethics: the individual who makes a decision is considered to take primary responsibility for the consequences of his decision. My sense is that there is one decision-maker for any given decision, and that the notion of a "group decision" is false, as the decision is made by one party, though others may participate in the process. I expect this to be argued, as the notion of a "group decision" is common - but this will be considered at another time.

Aside of providing information to the decision, which is addressed as part of the situation, there are individuals who attempt to influence the decision by participation in the decision-making process: suggesting the logic that should be applied, predicting the possible consequences, and otherwise providing information that is taken into account by the decision-maker.

Before the decision is put into action, there is a process of approval, in which other parties affirm the decision and indicate a willingness to commit resources to its execution. The latter is significant, as a decision is not made merely "to decide" but with the goal that the action decided upon will be undertaken, hence the refusal of any essential party to commit to the decision, and commit required resources to its execution, have significant influence over the decision-maker.

Action

Especially in organizational ethics, the individual who executes an action and the individual who makes the decision to act are often two different parties. The responsibility for the consequences is often shared between these two roles, though there is some argument over the degree to which responsibility applies.

In instances where the actor executes upon a decision made by another party, the ethics of his participation are primarily derived from his independent decision to comply with the orders he has been given. Compliance with an order does not usually exonerate the actor from bearing responsibility for the consequences, though it is generally considered to be a mitigating factor.

It's also worth noting that executing on a decision often requires additional decisions to be made. An order to build a bridge necessitates the executive to determine its design, obtain the materials, and coordinate the labor. These decisions may precipitate from his orders, but they are to be considered separate from the decision involved in issuing the order.

It's also worth noting that the decision to act is not made in an instant. There are few instances in which a commitment to undertake an action precludes the ability of an actor to cease activity at any time after it has begun. More often, there are constant opportunities to revisit the decision to act, and to desist in the course of action.

To return to the earlier concept of plurality, a group activity seems more plausible than a group decision - the members of a work crew much each contribute effort to achieve a goal. However, the decision of each member of the crew to apply himself to the execution of an action is an independent decision that he, alone, makes. In this regard, I presently make no distinction between an actor and an assistant, though I concede that additional consideration may discover significant differences in future.

Consequences

While I don't discount the possibility that there may be a role pertaining to the consequences of an action, I cannot immediately conceive of one. It would seem that the ability of the decision-maker and the actors to effect the consequences of an action are done during the time when the decision is being made and the actions are being undertaken. Once these have been done, the consequences are what they are.

The consequences of an action may necessitate further actions to be undertaken. This is of particular interest when the consequences are to be mitigated in arrears of an action that has caused harm or damage to be done, and there is said to be a responsibility to effect indemnity. But this becomes a separate decision, and a separate action.

However, in predicting the consequences of an action, it may be discovered that additional actions should be taken to guide the action or mitigate the consequences. The key difference is that this is done in advance of the action, rather than in arrears. An in that sense, any decision to include additional activities in a given action are part of the decision, rather than part of the consequences.

And in that sense, a person who provides information to the decision-maker about the possible consequences of an action that is under consideration is not acting in the context of the consequences, but is providing information in advance of the decision.

Even so, my sense is that isolating the task of assessing the consequences should be separated. While the implication is that the assessment will provide input into future decisions, the task itself is done in the context of the consequences, and possibly without an immediate intent to provide information to a specific future decision. I may revisit that later, but for the present, I will accept it as a "role."

Summation

In the consideration of the elements of action, a handful of tasks have been defined:

• Analyzing the situation
• Making the decision
• Influencing the decision
• Approving the decision
• Performing the action
• Assessing the consequences

Admittedly, I've switched channels from defining roles to defining tasks. My sense is that a "role" may include one or more of these tasks, and that the definition of roles may be arbitrary.