Doing Harm to Others

It has been concluded that an obligation that arises by virtue of the social environment is the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that do harm to others. The notion is that this is an obligation merits further consideration - but for the present, my intention is to focus on the concept of "doing harm."

The most plausible rationale for concluding that an action has done harm is in that it has ended the life of another person, as life has been defined as the primary value, from which all other values derive. This would seem to be axiomatic.

It would follow, then, that one could also conclude that harm has been done by any action that is derived from this fundamental value. To return to the hierarchy of needs, any action that places a person in immediate peril by preventing their ability to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, etc. can be concluded to do harm to that individual.

There is also some merit to the notion of there being degrees of harm: to injure a person is to do less harm than to injure him, to steal water that he is in immediate need of is to do less harm than to steal water he has secured to meet his future needs, to cause a neighbor to mistrust him is to do less harm than to subvert the trust of his spouse.

By strict and binary logic, to do harm at all is unethical, but the consideration of the degree of harm that has been done may be significant in some decisions. In particular, when an action would benefit one party and harm another, it may be reasoned that the benefit is "worth" the harm. I do not have the sense that the action can be considered ethical, since harm is done - but it stands to reason that certain decisions may involve choosing the least unethical course of action.

This brings to mind the assertion that it is impossible, under any circumstances, to take any action without causing harm to someone. I'm inclined to disagree - primarily because the notion is generally backed either by hypothetical situation involving conditions that are highly improbable, or contortions of logic that stretch and distort the concept of harm, or both.

The notion of harm becomes weaker at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It seems less plausible to assert that one has "done harm" if an action causes a person to feel less self-esteem or obstructs an individual from becoming more "self-actualized." It seems to me that the attempt to place upon another person an obligation for preserving one's own sense of self-worth is a manipulative tactic, common to the passive-aggressive personality type. While there may be some merit to this notion, I am unable to presently conceive of an example of a situation in which it would apply.

I don't consider this topic to be "closed" - there are a few other considerations that come to mind, and I am not confident that this logic is complete or entirely accurate, though I expect that this will suffice for most purposes.