Harm to Opportunity

There is a notion that it is possibly to do harm to others by undertaking actions that obstruct their opportunity to act – that is, because you have done something, another person no longer has the opportunity to act in a way that he intended: your action has prevented his action. While this seems plausible, it is extremely tenuous.

It is reasonable to conclude that one action may prevent another, whether by means of physical obstruction or by altering the environment in a way that the prerequisites of the second action are no longer possible. For a solitary individual in an environment devoid of others, it is an objective fact that the choice to perform one action prevents the performance of others, even if the only prerequisite is the time required to perform the task. In a social setting, it becomes more problematic.

My sense is that the notion of property settles most of the disputes about obstruction of opportunity. One cannot rightly claim that another person has obstructed his action if he had not the material prerequisites to undertake that action. That is to say, the person must own the property necessary to the action, or have the permission of the owner to use it.

In the latter instance, where the owner of property has granted permission to multiple parties for the use of property (such as “public” property that the state proposes to be available to all citizens), such conflicts can arise, and it is generally accepted that the owner is responsible for resolving these conflicts by being more specific in the conditions of the permission granted other parties. In the context of politics, this is the basis of a considerable amount of law.

With this in mind, I am unable to conceive of an instance in which the notion of doing harm by obstructing another party could be said to exist where no property is involved. And so, if one considers harm to opportunity, it is most often a consequence of harm to property – though the logic seems to become circular when harm to property is grounded in the harm to opportunity. As such, I can conclude that the two are related, but the cause-and-effect nature of this relationship remains a bit muddled (specifically, in terms of which derives from the other).

Harm to Property

The notion of “property” entails the authority to use physical objects. Items are understood to belong to an “owner,” whether an individual or a group of individuals, who have control over their property and are entitled to use it. A person does not have an entitlement to the property of anyone else, except by permission of the owner.

This notion is much debated in politics, and while that is beyond the scope of this study, it stands to note that political systems also ascribe to the notion of property, whether it is the use of property by a governmental organization, or when the ownership is implicit in that the privilege of any citizen or class to use the property by permission of government. While I’d prefer to avoid digressing, I expect there will invariably arise an instance in which property is controlled by government, or in which the property of an individual is usurped by government (e.g., taxation), and will consider it further in that context.

For the present, my sense is that it can be taken as premise that an individual or organization claims certain items as “owned” and maintains the right to use them or grant permission for others to use them, and other parties are expected to acknowledge their ownership and refrain from doing harm to the property of others without explicit permission.

It’s also worth nothing that property is central to the notion of business, as the chief activities of business pertain not to action, but to property: obtaining property, using it, providing it to others) in exchange for other property), so I expect it is a topic of constant concern.

In the present context of doing harm, harm to property is derive from harm to person. To damage or destroy property is to diminish or eliminate the owner’s ability to act in the interests of serving their needs to which that property is requisite. For example, to destroy or taint food is to interfere with the owner’s ability to eat, which is in turn to do physical damage to the owner of property.

Neglect versus Harm

In considering of the notion of "doing harm" to others, harm was considered only as a consequences of action. I have considered the possibility that harm could also be considered to arise from a person's neglect to act - and am led to the conclusion that this is not the equivalent of doing harm.

Primarily, an action is considered to be ethical or unethical by virtue of its consequences. When a person has not taken an action, no consequences have been effected, and there is no basis for the ethical evaluation of something that has no been done. Even so, there remains the argument that harm has been done by an individual's neglect.

This does not stand to reason: in a situation where an individual has neglected to undertake an action for the benefit of another party, harm is not caused. The other party was already in a situation where harm would come to them, and the neglect of another party to render assistance is not the cause of that harm, nor does their choice not to render assistance, in itself, cause the harm to be increased - the harm would befall the other party if the actor were entirely absent from the situation, and his mere presence does not obligate him to act.

This is not to say that neglect is acceptable in all situations: specifically, in the instance where there is a relationship between to individuals, it is generally (though not universally) understood that one of the conditions of a relationship is mutual assistance in time of need.

While this seems a reasonable conclusion, it rests upon a few notions that have not been explored as yet: the notion of a relationship (which has been considered previously 10/5 but in a superficial manner) and the notion that conditions of a relationship may be implicit.

The concept that a relationship exists between any two parties due to proximity is largely a concern of politics - which implies that otherwise unacquainted persons have an implicit relationship with one another as members of a of a given society or community (which are also abstract notions) - and that any member of a society is obligated, under certain circumstances, to provide assistance to other members of the society. But again, political arguments are beyond the scope of the topic of this blog.

While I cannot concede the obligation of one person to render aid to another, I can conceive that a party may feel entitled to grant assistance to others, and that this may in certain situations be entirely ethical. Provided he has sufficient understanding of the situation to be reasonably certain that the other party will come to harm, the decision to render aid is rational. And provided his actions do no harm, the action may be considered to be ethical.

However, this is a digression to another topic - whether it is ethical to undertake action for the benefit of others, which has previously been considered. The present question is whether it neglecting to act for the benefit of others can be considered the equivalent of doing harm - and I am reasonably confident in the conclusion that it cannot.

Doing Harm to Others

It has been concluded that an obligation that arises by virtue of the social environment is the obligation to refrain from acting in ways that do harm to others. The notion is that this is an obligation merits further consideration - but for the present, my intention is to focus on the concept of "doing harm."

The most plausible rationale for concluding that an action has done harm is in that it has ended the life of another person, as life has been defined as the primary value, from which all other values derive. This would seem to be axiomatic.

It would follow, then, that one could also conclude that harm has been done by any action that is derived from this fundamental value. To return to the hierarchy of needs, any action that places a person in immediate peril by preventing their ability to eat, drink, breathe, sleep, etc. can be concluded to do harm to that individual.

There is also some merit to the notion of there being degrees of harm: to injure a person is to do less harm than to injure him, to steal water that he is in immediate need of is to do less harm than to steal water he has secured to meet his future needs, to cause a neighbor to mistrust him is to do less harm than to subvert the trust of his spouse.

By strict and binary logic, to do harm at all is unethical, but the consideration of the degree of harm that has been done may be significant in some decisions. In particular, when an action would benefit one party and harm another, it may be reasoned that the benefit is "worth" the harm. I do not have the sense that the action can be considered ethical, since harm is done - but it stands to reason that certain decisions may involve choosing the least unethical course of action.

This brings to mind the assertion that it is impossible, under any circumstances, to take any action without causing harm to someone. I'm inclined to disagree - primarily because the notion is generally backed either by hypothetical situation involving conditions that are highly improbable, or contortions of logic that stretch and distort the concept of harm, or both.

The notion of harm becomes weaker at the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It seems less plausible to assert that one has "done harm" if an action causes a person to feel less self-esteem or obstructs an individual from becoming more "self-actualized." It seems to me that the attempt to place upon another person an obligation for preserving one's own sense of self-worth is a manipulative tactic, common to the passive-aggressive personality type. While there may be some merit to this notion, I am unable to presently conceive of an example of a situation in which it would apply.

I don't consider this topic to be "closed" - there are a few other considerations that come to mind, and I am not confident that this logic is complete or entirely accurate, though I expect that this will suffice for most purposes.